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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are mobile ad hoc networks in which sensors 
have limited resources and communication capabilities. Secure communications in 
some wireless sensor networks are critical. Key management is the fundamental 
security mechanism in wireless sensor network. To achieve security in WSN, it is 
important to be able to encrypt the messages sent between sensor nodes. In our thesis, 
we present an enhanced heterogeneous tree based key management scheme for  
security of wireless sensor networks. Our scheme combines efficiently different key 
management techniques in each architecture level and also it has it’s our dynamic key 
renewal process. Here whenever a node is compromised key renewal is done by one 
way hash functions and simple XOR operations. This combination gives the scheme 
good performances in terms of key storage overhead as well as in terms of attack for 
node capture. We compared our scheme with most other heterogeneous schemes and 
overall our scheme gives better performances. 
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CHAPTER I 
OVERVIEW ON WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
1.1 What Is Wireless sensor networks 
 
Wireless sensor networks(WSNs) are the wireless networks that comprise 
a large number of spatially distributed small autonomous devices cooperatively 
monitoring environmental conditions and sending the collected data to a 
command center(called Base Station) using wireless channels. This small 
device, called sensor node, consists of sensor, wireless communication device, 
small micro- controller and energy source.  
 
Wireless sensor network has some unique characteristics such as large 
scale of deployment, mobility of nodes, node failures, communication failures and 
dynamic network topology. In addition, each sensor node has constraints on 
resource such as energy, memory, computation speed and bandwidth because 
of the constraints on size and cost. 
 
WSN have many applications in both military and civilian such as 
battlefield surveillance, habitat monitoring, healthcare, environmental monitoring, 
industrial monitoring, greenhouse monitoring, traffic control, etc. Many 
applications of the WSN require secure communications. However, Wireless 
sensor network are prone to different types of malicious attacks, such as 
impersonating, masquerading, interception for misleading because of the 
wireless connectivity, the absence of the physical protection and the unattended 
deployment, etc. Therefore, the security in sensor network is extremely 
important. However, the characteristics of the wireless sensor network make the 
incorporating security very challenge. The constraints on sensor make the design 
and operation exceedingly different from the contemporary wireless networks.  
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The existing security mechanisms for the wire-line and wireless networks 
cannot apply to the wireless sensor network because of the constrained energy, 
memory and computation capability. Thus, resource conscious security protocols 
and management techniques become necessity. Key management protocols are 
the core of the secure communications. The goal of the key management is to 
establish secure links between neighbor sensors at network formation phase. In 
our thesis we have tried to build a security scheme that seamlessly integrate 
WSN security in an energy efficient way.  
 
1.2 Characteristics of WSN 
 
Unique characteristics of a WSN include: 
 
 Limited power they can harvest or store 
 Ability to withstand harsh environmental conditions 
 Ability to cope with node failures 
 Mobility of nodes 
 Dynamic network topology 
 Communication failures 
 Heterogeneity of nodes 
 Large scale of deployment 
 Unattended operation 
 Node capacity is scalable only limited by bandwidth of gateway node. 
 
Sensor nodes can be imagined as small computers, extremely basic in terms 
of their interfaces and their components. They usually consist of a processing 
unit with limited computational power and limited memory, sensors (including 
specific conditioning circuitry), a communication device (usually radio 
transceivers or alternatively optical), and a power source usually in the form of a 
battery. Other possible inclusions are energy harvesting modules, secondary 
ASICs, and possibly secondary communication devices (e.g. RS-232 or USB). 
 
The base stations are one or more distinguished components of the WSN 
with much more computational, energy and communication resources. They act 
as a gateway between sensor nodes and the end user. 
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1.3 Applications Of WSN 
 
The applications for WSNs are varied, typically involving some kind of 
monitoring, tracking, or controlling. Specific applications include habitat 
monitoring, object tracking, nuclear reactor control, fire detection, and traffic 
monitoring. In a typical application, a WSN is scattered in a region where it is 
meant to collect data through its sensor nodes. 
 
1.3.1 Area Monitoring 
 
Area monitoring is a common application of WSNs. In area monitoring, the 
WSN is deployed over a region where some phenomenon is to be monitored. For 
example, a large quantity of sensor nodes could be deployed over a battlefield to 
detect enemy intrusion instead of using landmines. When the sensors detect the 
event being monitored (heat, pressure, sound, light, electro-magnetic field, 
vibration, etc), the event needs to be reported to one of the base stations, which 
can take appropriate action (e.g., send a message on the internet or to a 
satellite). Depending on the exact application, different objective functions will 
require different data-propagation strategies, depending on things such as need 
for real-time response, redundancy of the data (which can be tackled via data 
aggregation and information fusion techniques), need for security, etc. 
 
1.3.2 Environmental Monitoring 
 
A number of WSNs have been deployed for environmental monitoring. 
Many of these have been short lived, often due to the prototype nature of the 
projects. Examples of longer-lived deployments are monitoring the state of 
permafrost in the Swiss Alps: The PermaSense Project, PermaSense Online 
Data Viewer and glacier monitoring. 
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1.3.3  Machine Health Monitoring Or Condition Based Maintenance 
 
Wireless sensor networks have been developed for machinery condition-
based maintenance (CBM) as they offer significant cost savings and enable new 
functionalities. In wired systems, the installation of enough sensors is often 
limited by the cost of wiring, which runs between $10–$1000 per foot. Previously 
inaccessible locations, rotating machinery, hazardous or restricted areas, and 
mobile assets can now be reached with wireless sensors. Often, companies use 
manual techniques to calibrate, measure, and maintain equipment. This labor-
intensive method not only increases the cost of maintenance but also makes the 
system prone to human errors. Especially in US Navy shipboard systems, 
reduced manning levels make it imperative to install automated maintenance 
monitoring systems. Wireless sensor networks play an important role in providing 
this capability. 
 
1.3.4  Industrial Monitoring 
 
Water/Wastewater Monitoring: 
 
There are many opportunities for using wireless sensor networks within the 
water/wastewater industries. Facilities not wired for power or data transmission 
can be monitored using industrial wireless I/O devices and sensors powered 
using solar panels or battery packs. As part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), funding is available for some water and wastewater 
projects in most states. 
 
Landfill Ground Well Level Monitoring and Pump Counter: 
 
Wireless sensor networks can be used to measure and monitor the water 
levels within all ground wells in the landfill site and monitor leachate 
accumulation and removal. A wireless device and submersible pressure 
transmitter monitors the leachate level. The sensor information is wirelessly 
transmitted to a central data logging system to store the level data, perform 
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calculations, or notify personnel when a service vehicle is needed at a specific 
well. 
 
It is typical for leachate removal pumps to be installed with a totalizing 
counter mounted at the top of the well to monitor the pump cycles and to 
calculate the total volume of leachate removed from the well. For most current 
installations, this counter is read manually. Instead of manually collecting the 
pump count data, wireless devices can send data from the pumps back to a 
central control location to save time and eliminate errors. The control system 
uses this count information to determine when the pump is in operation, to 
calculate leachate extraction volume, and to schedule maintenance on the pump. 
 
Flare Stack Monitoring: 
 
Landfill managers need to accurately monitor methane gas production, 
removal, venting, and burning. Knowledge of both methane flow and temperature 
at the flare stack can define when methane is released into the enviro nment 
instead of combusted. To accurately determine methane production levels and 
flow, a pressure transducer can detect both pressure and vacuum present within 
the methane production system. 
 
Thermocouples connected to wireless I/O devices create the wireless 
sensor network that detects the heat of an active flame, verifying that methane is 
burning. Logically, if the meter is indicating a methane flow and the temperature 
at the flare stack is high, then the methane is burning correctly. If the meter 
indicates methane flow and the temperature is low, methane is releasing into the 
environment. 
 
Water Tower Level Monitoring: 
 
Water towers are used to add water and create water pressure to small 
communities or neighborhoods during peak use times to ensure water pressure 
is available to all users. Maintaining the water levels in these towers is important 
and requires constant monitoring and control. A wireless sensor network that 
includes submersible pressure sensors and float switches monitors the water 
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levels in the tower and wirelessly transmits this data back to a control location. 
When tower water levels fall, pumps to move more water from the reservoir to 
the tower are turned on. 
 
Vehicle Detection: 
Wireless sensor networks can use a range of sensors to detect the 
presence of vehicles ranging from motorcycles to train cars. 
Agriculture:  
 
Using wireless sensor networks within the agricultural industry is 
increasingly common. Gravity fed water systems can be monitored using 
pressure transmitters to monitor water tank levels, pumps can be controlled using 
wireless I/O devices, and water use can be measured and wirelessly transmitted 
back to a central control center for billing. Irrigation automation enables more 
efficient water use and reduces waste. 
 
Windrow Composting: 
 
Composting is the aerobic decomposition of biodegradable organic matter 
to produce compost, a nutrient-rich mulch of organic soil produced using food, 
wood, manure, and/or other organic material. One of the primary methods of 
composting involves using windrows. 
To ensure efficient and effective composting, the temperatures of the 
windrows must be measured and logged constantly. With accurate temperature 
measurements, facility managers can determine the optimum time to turn the 
windrows for quicker compost production. Manually collecting data is time 
consuming, cannot be done continually, and may expose the person collecting 
the data to harmful pathogens. Automatically collecting the data and wirelessly 
transmitting the data back to a centralized location allows composting 
temperatures to be continually recorded and logged, improving efficiency, 
reducing the time needed to complete a composting cycle, and minimizing 
human exposure and potential risk. 
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An industrial wireless I/O device mounted on a stake with two 
thermocouples, each at different depths, can automatically monitor the 
temperature at two depths within a compost windrow or stack. Temperature 
sensor readings are wirelessly transmitted back to the gateway or host system 
for data collection, analysis, and logging. Because the temperatures are 
measured and recorded continuously, the composting rows can be turned as 
soon as the temperature reaches the ideal point. Continuously monitoring the 
temperature may also provide an early warning to potential fire hazards by 
notifying personnel when temperatures exceed recommended ranges. 
 
Greenhouse Monitoring 
 
Wireless sensor networks are also used to control the temperature and 
humidity levels inside commercial greenhouses. When the temperature and 
humidity drops below specific levels, the greenhouse manager must be notified 
via e-mail or cell phone text message, or host systems can trigger misting 
systems, open vents, turn on fans, or control a wide variety of system responses. 
Because some wireless sensor networks are easy to install, they are also easy to 
move as the needs of the application change. 
 
1.4 Challenges In WSN 
 
There are various types of challenges wireless sensor network has to face 
also due to the nature of their work. Along with different type of attack by 
adversary, developing sensor networks that ensures high-security features with 
limited resources is a challenge too. Wireless Sensor networks cannot be costly 
made as there is always a great chance that they will be deployed in hostile 
environments and captured for key information or simply destroyed by an 
adversary, which, in turn, can cause huge losses. Part of these cost limitation 
constraints includes an inability to make sensor networks totally tamper-proof. 
Other sensor node constraints that must be kept in mind while developing a key 
establishment technique include battery life, transmission range, bandwidth, 
memory, and prior deployment knowledge. The challenges are discussed details 
in the following sections. 
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1.4.1 Attacks: 
 
Attacks against wireless sensor networks could be broadly considered 
from two different levels of views. One is the attack against the security 
mechanisms and another is against the basic mechanisms (like routing 
mechanisms). Here we point out the major attacks in wireless sensor networks.  
 
DoS attack: 
 
DoS attack tries to exhaust the resources available to sensor node by 
sending extra unnecessary packets and thus prevent network users from 
accessing services. In wireless sensor networks, several types of DoS  attacks in 
different layers might be performed. 
 
Attacks on Information in transit:  
 
Attacks on Information in transit means attackers with high processing power 
and large communication range can monitor the traffic flow and fabricate them to 
provide wrong information to the base.  
 
Sybil attack: 
 
In case of Sybil attack a node tries to forge the identities of more than one 
node to degrade the integrity and security of data.  
 
Blackhole attack: 
 
In Black hole attack a malicious node tries to attract all the traffics in sensor 
network the attacker listens to requests for routes then replies to the target nodes 
that it contains the high quality or shortest path to the base station. Once the 
malicious device has been able to insert itself between the communicating nodes 
(for example, sink and sensor node), it is able to do anything with the packets 
passing between them. 
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Wormhole attack: 
 
In case of Wormhole attack attacker tries to record and tunnel packets from 
one location to another in a network. Wormhole attack is a significant threat to 
wireless sensor networks, because; this sort of attack does not require 
compromising a sensor in the network rather, it could be performed even at the 
initial phase when the sensors start to discover the neighboring information. 
 
Hello Flood Attack: 
 
In case of Hello Flood Attack an attacker with a high radio transmission range 
sends HELLO packets to the sensor nodes. The sensors are thus convinced that 
the attacker is their neighbor. As a result, the victim nodes go through the 
attacker while sending information to the base and are ultimately spoofed by the 
attacker. 
 
Clone attack:  
 
Once a sensor is compromised, the adversary can easily launch clone 
attacks by replicating the compromised node, distributing the clones throughout 
the network, and starting a variety of other attacks such as insider attacks.  
 
1.4.2 Battery life:  
 
Sensor nodes have a limited battery life, which can make using 
asymmetric key techniques, like public key cryptography, impractical as they use 
much more energy for their integral complex mathematical calculations. This 
constraint is mitigated by making use of more efficient symmetric techniques that 
involve fewer computational procedures and require less energy to function.  
 
1.4.3 Transmission range:  
 
Limited energy supply also restricts transmission range. Sensor nodes can 
only transmit messages up to specified short distances since increasing the 
range may lead to power drain. Techniques like in-network processing can help 
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to achieve better performance by aggregating and transmitting only processed 
information by only a few nodes. This way it can save the dissipated energy.  
 
1.4.4   Bandwidth:  
 
It is not efficient to transfer large blocks of data with the limited bandwidth 
capacity of typical sensor nodes, such as the transmitter of the UC Berkeley Mica 
platform that only has a bandwidth of 10Kbps. To compensate, key 
establishment techniques should only allow small chunks of data to be 
transferred at a time. 
 
1.4.5 Memory: 
 
Memory availability of sensor nodes is usually 6–8 Kbps, half of which is 
occupied by a typical sensor network operating system, like TinyOS. Key 
establishment techniques must use the remaining limited storage space 
efficiently by storing keys in memory, buffering stored messages, etc. 
 
1.4.6 Prior deployment knowledge: 
 
As the nodes in sensor networks are deployed randomly and dynamically, 
it is not possible to maintain knowledge of every placement. A key establishment 
technique should not, therefore, be aware of where nodes are deployed when 
initializing keys in the network. 
 
1.5 Requirements, Constraints And Evaluation Metrics Of WSN 
 
Before going into detailed discussion about individual scheme we would 
like to discuss about the characteristics of secure communication in wireless 
sensor network. 
 
The achievement of communication security is a challenging task because 
of the “fragile nature” of WSN. WSN have a set of characteristics which 
complicates the implementation of traditional security and key management 
solutions. 
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First of all, the wireless nature of communications in WSN makes it easier 
for attackers to intercept all transmitted packets. Second, WSN are constrained 
by the limited resources. Due to the following limitations, it is difficult to 
implement complicated security solutions in WSN. Third, in many cases, a large 
number of sensors are needed to be deployed in a hostile environment, which 
makes it very hard to have a continuous control on sensors. Finally, WSN are 
vulnerable to physical attackers. An attacker can capture one or more sensors 
and reveal all stored security information (particularly stored keys) which enables 
him to compromise a part of the WSN communications.  
 
For all these reasons, an efficient key management scheme should be 
implemented in the sensor before its deployment. The key establishment 
technique employed in a given sensor network should meet several requirements 
to be efficient. These requirements may include supporting in-network processing 
and facilitating self-organization of data, among others. However, the key 
establishment technique for a secure application must minimally incorporate 
authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, scalability, and flexibility.  
 
Authenticity:  
 
The key establishment technique should guarantee that the 
communication nodes in the network can verify the authenticity of the other 
nodes involved in a communication. The receiver node should recognize the 
assigned ID of the sender node. 
 
Confidentiality: 
  
 The key establishment technique should defend the expose of data from 
illegal parties. An opposition may attack a sensor network by obtaining secret 
keys. A better key Management scheme controls the compromised nodes so 
that data is not farther revealed. 
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Integrity:  
 
Here integrity means only the nodes in the network should have access to 
the key sand only an assigned base station should have the privilege to change 
the keys. Unauthorized nodes should not be able to establish communications 
with network nodes and thus gain entry into the network. 
 
Scalability:  
 
Sensor networks should employ a scalable key establishment technique. 
Key establishment techniques employed should provide high-security features for 
small networks, but also maintain these characteristics when applied to larger 
ones. 
Flexibility: 
 Key establishment techniques should be able to function well in any kind of 
environments and support dynamic deployment of nodes, i.e., a key 
establishment technique should be useful in multiple applications and allow for 
adding nodes at any time. 
 
 A key establishment technique is not judged solely based upon its ability 
to    provide secrecy of transferred messages, but must also meet certain other 
criteria for efficiency in light of vulnerability to adversaries, including resistance, 
revocation, and resilience. 
 
Resistance against node capture:  
 
     An adversary might attack the network by compromising a few nodes in the 
network and then replicate those nodes back into the network. Using this attack 
the adversary can populate the whole network with his replicated nodes and 
thereby gain control of the entire network. A good key establishment technique 
must resist node replication to guard against such attacks. 
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Revocation:  
 
 If a sensor network becomes invaded by an adversary, the key 
establishment technique should provide an efficient way to dynamically remove 
the compromised nodes. 
 
Resilience:  
 
      If a node within a sensor network is captured by adversary, the key 
establishment technique should ensure that secret information about other 
uncompromised nodes is not revealed. A scheme‟s resilience is calculated using 
the total number of nodes compromised and the total fraction of       
communications compromised in the network. Resilience also means 
conveniently making new inserted sensors to join secure communications. 
 
 Key management protocols are the core of the secure communications. The 
goal of the key management is to establish secure links between neighbor 
sensors at network formation phase. Several key management schemes have 
been proposed in recent years. Recently, many key management schemes for 
the wireless sensor network have been proposed. Some researchers have 
investigated the wireless sensor networks key management schemes and 
divided them into different categories. The major categories will be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
DIFFERENT SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES TO 
OVERCOME ATTACKS AND TO ENSURE SECURITY IN WSN 
 
 
Key management schemes can be classified into three categories based 
on the encryption techniques:  symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid. In our pre-the 
thesis we have mainly studied the symmetric schemes as Symmetric-key based 
schemes are widely used because of their relatively less computation complexity, 
which are suitable for the limited resource characteristics of the wireless sensor 
network. Most of the wireless sensor network uses the symmetric key schemes 
because these schemes consume less computation time than other schemes. 
Symmetric schemes can be broken down into homogeneous and heterogeneous 
schemes. There are two desirable characteristics of a sensor network lower 
hardware cost, and uniform energy drainage. While heterogeneous networks 
achieve the former, the homogeneous networks achieve the latter. However both 
features cannot be incorporated in the same network.  
 
2.1  Homogeneous Key Management Schemes: 
 
In homogeneous networks all the sensor nodes are identical in terms of 
battery energy and hardware complexity. With purely static clustering (cluster 
heads once elected, serve for the entire lifetime of the network) in a 
homogeneous network, it is evident that the nodes communicating with base 
station will be over-loaded with the long range transmissions to the remote base 
station, and the extra processing necessary for data aggregation and protocol 
coordination. As a result such nodes expire before other nodes. However it is 
desirable to ensure that all the nodes run out of their battery at about the same 
time, so that very little residual energy is wasted when the system expires. 
Another characteristic of homogeneous network is role rotation that is all the 
nodes should be capable of acting as the node communicating with base station 
and therefore should possess the necessary hardware capabilities. Few major 
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schemes of homogeneous key management technique are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
2.1.1 Entity based scheme 
 
Entity based schemes or arbitrated scheme share those schemes in which 
key distributions and key establishment are based on trusted entity. There are 
different types of Entity based scheme. Master Key Technique Trusted third node 
based scheme and Base station participation scheme are examples of Entity 
based scheme and they are discussed below: 
 
Master Key Technique: 
 
In this scheme as proposed by Lai et al. (2002) [1] a single key, the master 
key, is preloaded into all the nodes of the network. After deployment, every node 
in the network can use this key to encrypt and decrypt messages. Scheme in [1] 
counters several constraints with less computation and reduced memory use, but 
it fails in providing the basic requirements of a sensor network by making it easy 
for an adversary trying to attack. 
 
Benefits:  
 
 This technique has minimal storage requirements and avoids complex 
protocols. 
 Only a single key is to be stored in the nodes memory and once deployed 
in the network, there is no need for a node to perform key discovery or key 
exchange. 
 Offers Infinite scalability. 
 
Flaws:  
 
 The main drawback is that compromise of a single node causes the 
compromise of the entire network through the shared key. 
 
Improvement:  
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We can improve the scheme by erasing the master key after the pairwise 
keys are established. As a result the resilience is improved but when new nodes 
are added later they still have master key which makes the network not 
completely secure. 
 
Base station participation scheme: 
 
In this scheme as presented by Perrig et al. (2001) presented [2], the 
nodes are pre-initialized with a single key shared with an online server known as 
the key distribution center (KDC). When the users want to establish secure 
communication among them, each one of them has to obtain a new session key, 
encrypted with this pre-initialized key, from the KDC.  
 
 
Benefit:  
 The scheme in [2] has small memory requirement and perfectly controlled 
node replication. 
 It is resilient to node capture and possible to revoke key pairs. 
 
Flaws:  
 
 The scheme in [2]   is not scalable and the base station becomes the 
target of attacks. 
 
Trusted third node based scheme: 
 
Chan and Perrig (2005)  [3] peer intermediaries for key establishment in 
sensor network called „„PIKE‟‟. In this scheme, the key establishment between 
two sensor nodes is based on the common trust of a third node. For any two 
nodes of A and B, there is a node C that shares a key with nodes A and B. 
 
2.1.2 Random key pre-distribution scheme 
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In the Basic Scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor[4], key distribution 
is divided into three stages: key pre-distribution, shared-key discovery, and path-
key establishment. 
Stage 1: Key pre-distribution stage 
   
In the key pre-distribution stage, a large key pool of |s| keys and their 
identifiers are generated. From this key pool, K keys are randomly drawn and 
pre-distributed into each node‟s key ring, including the identifiers of all those 
keys. This key pre-distribution process ensures that, though the size of the 
network is large, only a few keys need to be stored in each node‟s memory, 
thereby saving storage space. These few keys are enough to ensure that two 
nodes share a common key, based on a selected probability. 
Stage 2: Shared-key discovery stage: 
 
Once the nodes are initialized with keys, they are deployed in the 
respective places where they are needed, such as hospitals, war fields, etc. After 
deployment, each node tries to discover its neighbors with which it shares  
common keys. There are many ways for finding out whether two nodes share 
common keys or not. The simplest way is to make the nodes broadcast their 
identifier lists to other nodes. If a node finds out that it shares a common key with 
a particular node, it can use this key for secure communication. This approach 
does not give the adversary any new attack opportunities and only leaves room 
for launching a traffic analysis attack in the absence of key identifiers.  
 
Stage 3: Path key establishment stage:  
 
The path key establishment stage makes provision for link between two 
nodes even when they do not share a common key. Let us suppose that node u 
wants to communicate with node v, but they do not share a common key 
between them. Node u can send a message to node y saying that it wants to 
communicate with node v; this message is then encrypted using the common key 
shared between node u and node y and, if node y has a key in common with 
node v, it can generate a pair wise key Kuv for nodes u and v, thereby acting like 
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a key distribution center or a mediator between the communication of nodes u 
and v. As all the communications are encrypted using their respective shared 
keys, there will not be a security break in this process. After the shared key 
discovery stage is finished there will be a number of Keys left in each sensor‟s 
key ring that are unused and can be put to work by each sensor node for path 
key establishment. 
In the Basic Scheme, node revocation is conducted by the controller node. 
When a node is revoked, all the keys in that particular node key ring have to be 
deleted from the network. After the matching keys are completely deleted from all 
the nodes, there may be links missing between different ones and they then have 
to reconfigure themselves starting from the hared key discovery stage so that 
new links can be formed between them. As only few keys are removed from the 
network, the revocation process only affects a part of it and does not incur much 
communication overhead. 
 
Analysis of the basic pre-distribution Scheme: 
 
If the probability that a common key exists between two nodes in the 
network is p, and the size of the network is n. The degree of a node d is derivable 
using both p and n. since the degree of any node is simply the average number 
of edges connecting that node with other nodes in its neighborhood, therefore,  
 
                                    d = p · (n -1)     (2.1) 
 
The value of d is such that a network of n nodes is connected with a given 
probability P. We then must calculate the key ring size k and the size of the key 
pool |S|.  
 
Connectivity of the wireless sensor network can be analyzed by the 
random-graph theory .A random graph G (n, p) is a graph of n nodes, in which 
the probability that a link exists between two nodes is p. Given a desired 
probability Pc for graph connectivity, the function p is defined as follows: 
 
 P lim→∞ = Pr [G (n, p) is connected] =   (2.2) 
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  ,      (2.3) 
 
 here c is a real constant.        
Eschenauer and Gligor have shown that for a pool size S = 10,000 keys, 
only 75 keys need to be stored in a node‟s memory to have the probability that 
they share a key in their key rings to be p = 0.5. If the pool size is ten times 
larger, i.e. S= 100,000, then the number of keys required is still  only 250.  
 
Benefits: 
 
 Advantages of [4] include flexible, efficient, and fairly simple to employ,  
 Also offering good scalability.  
 
Flaws: 
 
 It cannot be used in circumstances demanding heightened security and 
node to node authentication. 
 It does not provide the node-to-node authentication property that 
ascertains the identity of a node with which another node is 
communicating. 
 
Improvement on the Basic scheme: 
 
Many key management schemes are proposed as extensions of the Basic 
Scheme to make it even more secure and reliable. Improvement can be brought 
In Basic scheme version to enhance the security. Three improvements have 
been proposed by Chan and Perrig .The first one is called q-composite keys 
scheme introduced by Chan, Perrig, and Song [5]. This scheme employs q 
common keys to set up the common key with a hash function rather than only 
one. They showed that this scheme strengthens the network‟s resilience against 
node capture attack when the number of node capture is small .But it may make 
the network more vulnerable once a large number of nodes have been breached. 
The second scheme is called multi-path key reinforcement presented also in [5] . 
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This scheme establishes the link key through multiple paths to strengthen the 
security. The tradeoff is that it increases the communication overhead in wireless 
sensor network. There is a third variation which is an enhancement of the 
commonly known Pair wise Scheme, called Random Pair wise Scheme was also 
proposed by them in [5] . 
 
Q-Composite Random Key Pre-distribution Scheme: 
 
The Q-Composite Random Key Pre-distribution introduced in [5] requires that 
two nodes have at least q common keys to set up a link. In the process, nodes 
will fail to establish a link if the number of keys shared is less than q; otherwise, 
they will form a new communication link using the hash of all the q keys  
 
K = hash (k1i k2i . . . . . . . kq i)    (2.4) 
 
As the amount of key overlap between two nodes is increased, it becomes 
harder for an adversary to break their communication link. But S, the size of the 
key pool, is the critical parameter that must be calculated for the Q-Composite 
Scheme to be efficient. If S is large, then the probability that two nodes share a 
common key and therefore can communicate is decreased. However, if S is 
decreased, an adversary‟s job may be easier as he can now gather most of the 
keys in the key pool by capturing only a few nodes. Thus, S must be chosen 
such that the probability of any two nodes sharing at least q keys is larger than or 
equal to p. 
Scheme in [5] offers greater resilience compared to the Basic Scheme when a 
small number of nodes have been captured in the network. The amount of 
communications that are compromised in a given network with the Q-Composite 
Scheme applied is 4.74 percent when there are 50 compromised nodes, while 
the same network with the Basic Scheme applied will have 9.52 percent of 
communications compromised. Though [5] performs badly when more nodes are 
captured in a network, this may prove a reasonable concession as adversaries 
are more likely to commit a small-scale attack and preventing smaller attacks can 
push an adversary to launch a large-scale attack, which is far easier to detect. 
 
Benefits: 
21 
 
 
 It provides better security than the Basic Scheme by requiring more keys for 
two nodes to share one for communication, which makes it difficult for an 
adversary to compromise a node.  
 Offers greater resilience compared to the Basic Scheme.  
Flaws: 
 Disadvantages of this scheme include that it is vulnerable to breakdown 
under large-scale attacks  
 Does not satisfy scalability requirements. 
 
Multipath key reinforcement scheme: 
 
The Multipath Reinforcement Scheme presented in [5] offers good security 
with additional communication overhead for use where security is more of a 
concern than bandwidth or power drain. 
The idea of using a multipath to reinforce links in a random key 
establishment scheme was first explored by Anderson and Perrig. Chan, Perrig, 
and Song further developed the Multipath Key Reinforcement Scheme for 
establishing a link between two nodes of a given network that is stronger than 
that in the Basic Scheme. 
 
     The links formed between nodes after the key discovery phase in the Basic 
Scheme are not totally secure due to the random selection of keys from the key 
pool allowing nodes in a network to share some of the same keys and, thereby, 
possibly threaten multiple nodes when only one is compromised. To solve this 
problem, the communication key between nodes must be updated when one is 
compromised once a secure link is formed. This should not be done via the 
already established link, as an adversary might decrypt the communication to 
obtain the new key, but should be coordinated using multiple independent paths 
for greater security. 
 
    (2.5) 
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If node A needs an updated communication key with node B, all possible 
disjointed paths to node B must be used. Assume that there are h such disjointed 
paths from node A to node B. Then node A generates h random values (g1,g2, . . 
. ,gh)  each equal to the size of an encryption key, and sends one down each 
available disjointed path to node B. When node B has received all h random 
values, it computes the new encryption key at the same time as node A does 
form a new and secure communication link with   using equation (2.5) .Here k is 
the original key. 
With the new link in place, the only way an adversary can decrypt the 
communications is to compromise all the nodes involved in the formation of the 
key. The larger h is, the more paths and nodes involved and the greater the 
security of the new link. This increase in network communications causes 
excessive overhead in finding multiple disjointed paths between two nodes. Also, 
as the size of a path increases, it may grow so long as it leaves a chance for an 
adversary to eavesdrop, which makes the whole path insecure. 
Benefits: 
 It offers better security than in [2] or the Q-Composite. 
 The only way an adversary can decrypt the communications is to 
compromise all the nodes involved in the formation of the key. 
Flaws: 
 It creates communication overhead that can lead to depleted node battery 
life. 
 Enhance the chance for an adversary to launch DOS attacks. 
Improvement: 
 
A 2-hop approach to the Multipath Key Reinforcement Scheme considers 
only 2-link paths to minimize the overhead of path length by using disjointed 
paths that are only one intermediate node away from the two original nodes (A 
and B). 
 
Random pair wise key scheme: 
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Chan, Perrig, and Song developed the Random Pair wise scheme in [5] as 
an extension of the Pair wise Scheme to help overcome this drawback.  
In the basic version of this technique, called the trivial solution, each node should 
store exactly (N − 1) pair-wise keys; one key with each other sensor in the 
network. This basic version offers a high level of resistance against node capture 
attack. However it suffers from important memory consumption for key storage. It 
is a non scalable solution, and may only be used in small or medium WSN.  
In Random pair-wise key scheme of [5], authors proposed to use only Np = 
Nxp keys instead of (N − 1) keys by each node, where p is the probability that 
two nodes in the network are connected. They stated that not al l n -1 keys are 
required to be stored in a node‟s key ring. As we have already seen with the 
Basic Scheme, not all nodes must be connected as long as node connections 
meet some desired probability P, which dictates that only (nxp) keys are needed 
to be stored in a given node‟s key ring, where n being the number of nodes in the 
network and p being the probability that two nodes can communicate securely. 
Given this, if k is the number of keys in a node‟s key ring, the maximum allowable 
network size can be determined with n = k/p for the Random Pair wise Scheme. 
By adapting the probability p to the WSN characteristics, we can reduce 
the number of stored keys, and hence the scalability, while keeping a good level 
of connectivity between nodes. 
 
Advantages:  
 
 Is offers the best security of all the above schemes with perfect resilience 
to node capture as the keys used by each node are unique. 
 Also provides resistance against node replication.  
 
Disadvantages:  
 
 Disadvantages of this scheme include that it does not support networks of 
large size 
 Does not satisfy scalability requirements. 
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2.1.3 Polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme 
 
Polynomial key pre-distribution scheme is the basis of pair-wise keys pre-
distribution schemes developed by  Liu and Ning (2003) [6] .There is two form of 
this scheme. One is basic Polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution scheme 
and the other is Grid- based key pre-distribution scheme. 
 
In general in this scheme, in order to pre-distribute pairwise keys, one 
keyset-up sever randomly generates a t-degree polynomial  f(x , y)=∑ti, j   a i,j  x
i  yi  
over a finite field  Fq , where q is a prime number that is large enough to 
accommodate a cryptographic key, and has the property of f(x , y)= f(y , x) .  
 
In sensor network, each sensor is assumed to have a unique ID. For each 
sensor i, the set-up server computes a polynomial share of f(x, y) that is, f(i , y). 
For any two sensor nodes i and j, node i can compute the common key f(i, j)  by 
evaluating f(i, y)  at point j, and node j can compute the common key with i by 
evaluating f(j , y) at i. 
To enhance the security of the above scheme, Liu and Nin developed a 
polynomial pool-based pair wise key pre-distribution based on above scheme. 
The basic idea is the combination of polynomial- based key pre-distribution and 
the key pool idea. 
Polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution:  
 
Polynomial pool-based pair wise key pre-distribution uses a pool of 
multiple random bivariate polynomials and can be considered as extension of the 
polynomial-based scheme. When the polynomial pool has only one polynomial 
the general framework degenerates into the polynomial-based key pre- 
distribution. When all the polynomials are 0-degree ones, the polynomial pool 
degenerates into a key pool. Pair wise key establishment needs three phases: 
setup, direct key establishment, and path key establishment. 
 
In the setup phase, setup server randomly generates a set F of bivariate t-
degree polynomials over the finite field Fq. In the direct key establishment, if both 
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sensors have polynomial shares on the same bivariate polynomial, they can 
establish the pair wise key directly using the polynomial-based key pre-
distribution. The third phase is needed if direct key establishment fails. Two 
sensor nodes will establish a pair wise key with the help of other sensors. 
Compared with previous schemes, this scheme improved the security and the 
scalability.  
 
One instantiation of the general framework is called random subset 
assignment scheme. Subset assignment scheme uses a random strategy for 
subset assignment during the setup phase. The setup server selects a random 
subset of polynomials in F and assigns their polynomial shares to the each 
sensor. The main difference with the basic probabilistic scheme is that this 
scheme randomly chooses polynomials from a polynomial pool and assigns their 
polynomial shares to each sensor instead of randomly selecting keys from a 
large key pool and assigning them to sensors. Therefore, this scheme can be 
considered as an extension to the basic probabilistic scheme. The probability of 
two sensors sharing the same bivariate polynomial is the same as the probability 
of the two sharing a common key as described in the Basic Scheme. 
 
Grid- based key pre-distribution scheme: 
 
Another instantiation of the general framework is called grid- based key 
pre-distribution scheme presented in [6]. The setup server assigns each sensor 
in the network to a unique intersection in this grid. This scheme has some better 
properties over previous schemes. It is resilience to node compromise and there 
is no communication overhead during polynomial share discovery. 
 
     If a network consists of N sensor nodes, an (m x m) grid with a set of 2m 
polynomials is constructed, calculated as { f i 
c(x, y), fi 
r(x, y)}  i=0 to m- 1, Where 
the value of m is the square root of N. each row i in the grid is associated with a 
polynomial fi 
r(x, y) and each column of the grid is associated with a polynomial 
share fi c(x, y). 
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In the first stage, the setup server distributes an intersection in the grid to 
each node, and then distributes the polynomial shares of that particular column 
and row to the node to provide each node with the information required for key 
discovery and path key establishment. In the second stage, if a node i want to 
establish a pair wise key with node j, it checks for common rows or columns with 
j  i.e., ci = c j or ri = rj. The pair wise key can be established using the polynomial 
shares of a row or column that matches. If there is no match, then nodes i and j 
must find an alternate path. To do so, node i find an intermediate node through 
which it can establish a pair wise key with node j. Even if some intermediate 
nodes are compromised there exist many connecting paths in the grid between 
the two nodes. 
 
Advantages: 
 
 There will be a greater chance for nodes to establish a pairwise key with 
others without communication overhead as the sensors are deployed in a 
grid-like structure. 
 Nice resilience to node capture unti l a certain percentage of nodes are 
compromised (60 percent). 
 
Disadvantages: 
 
 This grid-based approach to the Polynomial Pool-Based Scheme has 
reasonable overhead when compared to other schemes. Each node must 
store 2 bivariate t-degree polynomials and IDs of the compromised nodes 
with which it can establish a pairwise key. 
 
2.1.4 Matrix-based key pre-distribution scheme 
 
Matrix based key pre-distribution scheme is built on Blom‟s key pre-
distribution scheme and combines the random key pre-distribution method with it. 
This scheme is thoroughly discussed in [7]. It  has the following λ-secure 
property: as long as an adversary compromises less than or equal to λ nodes, 
uncompromised nodes are perfectly secure; when an adversary compromises 
more than λ nodes, all pairwise keys of the entire network are compromised. The 
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threshold λ can be treated as a security parameter in that selection of a larger λ 
leads to a more secure network. However, λ also determines the amount of 
memory to store key information, as increasing λ leads to better security with 
higher memory usage. According to [7] , if two nodes carry key information from 
a common space, they can compute their pairwise key from the information; 
when two nodes do not carry key information from a common space, they can 
conduct key agreement via other nodes which share pairwise keys with them. 
 
Basic ideas: 
 
Basic idea of this scheme is introduced in [8].In [7], during the pre-
deployment phase, the base station first constructs a (λ + 1) × N matrix G over a 
finite field where N is the size of the network. G is considered as public 
information; any sensor can know the contents of G.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 (2.6) 
 
    
Then the base station creates a random (λ+1)×(λ+1)symmetric matrix D 
over GF(q), and computes an N × (λ + 1) matrix A = (D · G) T, where (D · G) T  is 
the transpose of D · G. Matrix D needs to be kept secret, and should not be 
disclosed to adversaries or any sensor node  Because D is symmetric, it is easy 
to see: 
 
A · G = (D · G) T · G = G T · D T · G = G T · D · G = (A · G) T . 
 
This means that A·G is a symmetric matrix. If we let K = A·G, we know 
that Kij = Kji, where Kij is the element in K located in the i 
th row and j th column. 
We use Kij (or Kji) as the pairwise key between node i and node j. Fig. 1 
illustrates how the pairwise key Kij = Kji is generated.  
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   Figure 2.1: Generating keys in Blom's Scheme  
    
To carry out the above computation, nodes i and j should be able to compute Kij 
and Kji, respectively. This can be easily achieved using the following key pre-
distribution scheme, for K = 1. . .N 
 
1. store the kth row of matrix A at node K 
2. store the kth column of matrix G at node K 
 
Therefore, when nodes i and j need to find the pairwise key between 
them, they first exchange their columns of G, and then they can compute Kij and 
Kji, respectively, using their private rows of A. The  scheme is λ-secure if any λ + 
1 columns of G are linearly independent. This λ-secure property guarantees that 
no nodes other than i and j can compute Kij or Kji if no more than λ nodes are 
compromised. 
 
Here G is a Vander monde Matrix hence when we store the kth column of 
G at node K, we only need to store the seed sk at this  node, and it  can 
regenerate the column given the seed. 
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In the improved version of [8], we change the complete graph into 
connected graph so that each node needs less memory to store key information. 
It assigns keys only to connected graph. Hence this scheme is scalable and 
more resilient to node capture. 
 
How the scheme works: 
 
Step 1: Key Pre-distribution Phase 
 
During the key pre-distribution phase, we need to assign key information 
to each node, such that after deployment, neighboring sensor nodes can find a 
secret key between them. Assume that each sensor node has a unique 
identification, whose range is from 1 to N. the base station create a generator 
matrix G of size (λ+1)×N. Let G(j) represent the jth column of G. We provide G(j) 
to node j. As mentioned above, although G(j) consists of (λ+1) elements, each 
sensor only needs to remember one seed. Then  Base station generate ω 
symmetric matrices D1,. . ., Dω of size (λ + 1) × (λ + 1). We call each tuple Si = 
(Di,G), i = 1, . . . , ω, a key space. We then compute the matrix Ai = (Di · G)T . Let 
Ai(j) represents the jth row of Ai. We randomly select  τ distinct key spaces from 
the ω key spaces for each node. For each space Si selected by node j, we store 
the jth row of Ai (i.e. Ai(j)) at this node. This information is secret and should stay 
within the node; According to [8], two nodes can find a common secret key if they 
have both picked a common key space. Since Ai is an N × (λ + 1) matrix, Ai(j) 
consists of (λ + 1) elements. Therefore, each node needs to store (λ+1)τ 
elements in its memory. 
 
Step 2: Key Agreement Phase 
 
Assume that nodes i and j are neighbors, and they have received  the 
above broadcast messages. If they find out that they have a common space, e.g. 
Sc, they can compute their pairwise secret key using [8]: Initially node i has Ac(i) 
and seed for G(i), and node j has Ac(j) and seed for G(j). After exchanging the 
seeds, node i can regenerate G(j) and node j can regenerate G(i); then the 
pairwise secret key between nodes i and j, Kij = Kji, can be computed in the 
following manner by these two nodes independently: 
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Kij = Kji = Ac(i) · G(j) = Ac(j) · G(i).    (2.7) 
 
After secret keys with neighbors are set up, the entire sensor network 
forms a connected graph as mentioned above. We now show how two 
neighboring nodes, i and j, who do not share a common key space could still 
come up with a pairwise secret key between them. Assume that the path is v i, v1,. 
. ., vt,vJ. To find a common secret key between i and j, i first generates a random 
key K. Then i sends the key to v1 using the secure link between i and v1; v1 sends 
the key to v2 using the secure link between v1 and v2, and so on until j receives 
the key from vt. Nodes i and j use this secret key K as their pairwise key. 
Because the key is always forwarded over a secure link, no nodes beyond this 
path can find out the key. 
 
Calculation of parameters: 
Here the probability that a connected graph,pc, is formed is when local 
connectivity  p actual must be greater than a minimum value known as p required. 
Let d be expected degree of a node,N size of network  and n be expected 
number of neighbor  
P  required=d/N=    (2.8) 
 
For a given  ω and   τ, 
Pactual=1-(2 nodes not sharing a any space) 
Pactual=                          (2.9) 
For a given  P required and  Pactual we can find  ω and τby solving below 
equation 
Pactual >=  P required 
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 >=                  (2.10) 
 
Costs incurred in the scheme are as follows: 
 
Storage:  m = (λ + 1) τ. 
 
Communication cost: When τ is large, communication cost is 2 hops(or number 
of hops neighbor is away)  
 
Computation cost: Regeneration of corresponding column of  G from a seed + 
doing inner product of corresponding row of (D · G) T with column of G is equal to 
(λ - 1)+ (λ + 1)=2(λ) 
 
Benefit: 
 Here is x nodes are compromised and x<λ, then no additional 
uncompromised nodes communication can be affected so  the fraction of 
communication links compromised should be the same as the fraction of 
the spaces compromised .  
 Less memory is needed as this scheme assigns keys only to nodes in 
connected graph instead I of entire graph . 
 Less energy consumed then any asymmetric scheme 
 this scheme is scalable  
 
Flaws: 
 
 Limitation of λ remains. If more than λ rows are compromised ,the entire 
secret matrix can be derived or broken by adversaries.  
 
Improvement: 
In this scheme resilience is greatly improved by using 2 hop neighbor. 
When we treat a two-hop neighbor as a neighbor, the radius of the range 
covered by a node doubles, so the area that a node can cover is increased by 
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four times. Therefore, the expected number of neighbor‟s n′ for each node in 
connected graph Geks is about four times as large as that in one hop connected 
graph Gks. to achieve the same connectivity Pc as that of Gks, the value of 
required for Geks is one fourth of the value of required for Gks. Thus, the value of 
pactual for Geks is one fourth of the value of pactual for Gks. As we have already 
shown, when  τ is fixed, the larger the value of ω is, the smaller the value of pactual 
is. For example, assuming a network size N = 10, 000 and the desirable 
connectivity = 0.99999, if we fix τ = 2, we need to select ω = 7 for the Gks-based 
key agreement scheme; however, using Geks-based scheme, we can select ω = 
31. The security of the latter scheme is improved significantly. there is about 4 
times security improvement of the two-hop-neighbor scheme over the basic 1-
hop-neighbor scheme. 
Attacks: 
 
It undergoes replication attack that is when the key space is broken by 
compromising λ keys adversaries can generate all the pairwise keys in that 
space and keys in that space can no longer be used for authentication purposes.  
 
 
2.2 Heterogeneous Key Management Schemes: 
 
In a heterogeneous sensor network, two or more different types of nodes 
with different battery energy and functionality are used. The motivation being that 
the more complex hardware and the extra battery energy can be embedded in 
few cluster head nodes, thereby reducing the hardware cost of the rest of the 
network. However using the cluster head nodes means that role rotation is no 
longer possible. When the sensor nodes use single hopping to reach the cluster 
head, the nodes that are farthest from the cluster heads always spend more 
energy than the nodes that are closer to the cluster heads. On the other hand 
when nodes use multi hopping to reach the cluster head, the nodes that are 
closest to the cluster head have the highest energy burden due to relaying . 
Consequently there always exists a non-uniform energy drainage pattern in the 
network. Two tree based heterogeneous schemes are discussed in following 
sections. 
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2.2.1 Star-like tree-based key pre-distribution schemes: 
 
A Star-like tree-based key pre-distribution scheme was proposed by Lee 
and Stinson (2005)[9] which were proposed to improve the resilience against 
node capture. The difference between these scheme and the random pre-
distribution schemes is that they are based on strongly regular graphs and 
random graph correspondingly. A strongly regular graph with parameters  (n, r, λ, 
µ) is a graph on n vertices,  without loops or multiple edges, regular of degree r 
(with 0 < r < n - 1), and such that any two distinct vertices have l common 
neighbors when they are adjacent, and m common neighbors when they are 
nonadjacent. A complete bipartite graph Kn,n is a(2n, n, 0, n)  strongly regular 
graph. 
 
The first scheme is called basic ID-based on-way function scheme. This 
scheme uses a public one-way hash function h in order to reduce the number of 
keys stored in a node. In this scheme, the connected regular graph G of order n 
and even degree r can base on network graph G to construct a key pool K= Kv: v 
ϵ G. Each sensor node is assigned a unique ID for computing secret key. For a 
sensor node u, it will be allocated a secret key Ku and hashed keys h (KV || ID 
(u)) if it is contained in a star-like sub graph centered at v. Since a node v can 
compute h( KV || ID(u)) by evaluating function h at the concatenation of its unique 
key Kv and ID(u), both u and v can establish their secret key h( KV || ID(u) ). 
Benefits: 
 One advantage over the pre-distribution schemes is that it reduced the 
number of keys per sensor by almost 50%.This is because each node v 
stores one secret key Kv and r=2 hashed keys for the node u such that v is 
contained in a star-like sub graph centered at u. Therefore, the total 
number of keys stored in a sensor node is given by r/2+1. 
 
 This scheme also has perfect resiliency. This is because if an adversary 
compromised a node and obtained Ku as well as h( KV || ID(u) ) for r=2 
adjacent nodes Vi, it is infeasible to compute Kvi even though he knows 
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the key h( KV || ID(u)) since h is a one-way function. Therefore, an 
adversary cannot compromise any link between two non-compromised 
nodes. 
Flaws: 
 The shortage of the basic ID-based one-way function scheme is that it can 
accommodate only O(k) sensor nodes for the node storage of k keys. 
Thus, it is not suitable for large size network. To meet the requirement for 
large size sensor network, multiple ID- based one-way function schemes 
are proposed based on the basic ID-based one-way function scheme at 
the cost of weakening the resiliency. 
 
2.2.2  Logical tree-based key pre-distribution schemes: 
 
Wallneretal. (1999)[10] proposed a group key management algorithm 
using the hierarchical binary tree (HBT). In this approach, only one group 
controller maintains a tree of keys, where each node corresponds to a KEK (key 
encryption key). Each group member corresponds to a leaf of the tree, and holds 
a node‟s KEK from its leaf to tree root. The group key is the key held by the root 
(Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 2.2: Hierarchical Binary Tree 
For a balanced tree, each member needs to store log2n keys; here n is the 
number of members and log2n is the height of the tree. For example, see Fig. 1, 
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where member U3 knows K3, K34, K14 and K, the number of members is 8 and 
the height of the tree is 4. When a new member joins the group, a new leaf is 
attached to the group tree. All the KEKs in the nodes from the new leaf‟s parent 
to the root have to be changed for backwards secrecy .Each of the new KEKs is 
encrypted with its respective node‟s children KEKs, and then sent to the related 
users. The size of this re-key message will be at most O(2log2n). When a 
member is removed from the group, this process is similar. This logical key tree 
technique for multicast key distribution has been extended to wireless sensor 
networks in Di Pietroetal. (2003) [11] and Lazos and Poovendran (2003,2002) 
[12]. This technique is grouped as the centralized group key management 
protocol. Centralized solutions are often not ideal for wireless sensor network. 
However, such a technique offers some utility to allow a more powerful base 
station to offload some of the computations from the less powerful sensor nodes. 
In [11] proposed a directed diffusion-based secure multicast scheme for wireless 
sensor network(LKHW). This scheme merges the logical key hierarchy with 
directed diffusion and takes the advantages of both of them. Directed diffusion is 
a data-centric, energy saving dissemination technique for wireless sensor 
networks (Intanagonwiwatet al., 2000)[13]. In directed diffusion, the human 
operator‟s query would be transformed in to an interest. The interest is then 
diffused throughout the network nodes (called source).The node will activate its 
sensors to collect information. The dissemination sets up gradients designed to 
draw data matching the interest. The collected data can be sent back to the 
originators (called sink) along multiple paths. The sensor network reinforces one, 
or a small number of these paths. In this LKHW scheme, secure group has to be 
established with group initialization before directed diffusion. Here, the security of 
query is supposed as same as the security as the data transferred. The protocol 
is described as follows:(1) The key distribution center (KDC) sends out „„interest 
about interest to join‟‟.(2)The interested nodes reply with “interest to join‟‟.(3)The 
KDC supplies key set and then secure interest and data encrypted with the group 
key.  
 
For dynamic groups, there are two protocols for the leave and join. When 
a node applies to join, a join „„interest‟‟ is generated which travels down the 
gradient that have previously established by „„interest about interest to join‟‟. 
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When a node joins, a key set is generated for the new node based on keys within 
the key hierarchy. The similar process for the leave is also given. 
 
Benefits:  
 This type of scheme is data-centric and is energy saving dissemination 
technique for wireless sensor networks.  
 A lot of attention is paid toward security by using KEK. 
 
Flaws:  
 Whenever a node is compromised a lot of messages are exchanged to 
update KEK and as there is only  one group controller so if that is 
compromised the entire network suffers  
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2.3 Comparison 
 
After discussing different types of symmetric key management scheme we 
can finally derive a comparison table that will enable us to choose a scheme as 
per requirement and resource present.  
 
Table 2.1: 
Comparison table of different types of key management schemes of WSN 
 
 
 Computation Communication Storage 
entity based 
schemes 
 
Depends on 
Network size 
1X1 1X1 
Random key pre-
distribution 
schemes 
 
Depends degree 
of a node  
dX1 dXk 
Pair wise key pre-
distribution 
Depends on 
Network size 
1X1 2N 
polynomial-based 
key pre-
distribution 
schemes 
Depends on 
Network size 
dX1 dXk 
matrix-based key 
pre-distribution   
2(λ) 
 
2 hops 
 
(λ + 1)τ 
Hierarchical binary 
tree-based key 
pre-distribution 
schemes  
 
 
2log2n log 2 n 
h
 i=0 Σ 2 
I 
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CHAPTER III 
RELATED WORKS 
 
 
So far most of the key distribution schemes in wireless sensor networks 
we have studied through our survey assume that there is the need for every 
sensor node to be able to securely communicate with every other node from the 
network. This is a very strong assumption that might not be realistic in a real 
world sensor scenario. In case of the random pre-distribution schemes every 
sensor node receives a huge subset of an even larger set of pool-keys from the 
user. If two nodes want to communicate they need to have at least one common 
key in their subset. In such a way a lot of memory is wasted, which is especially 
critical for low memory sensor devices. 
 
Another assumption that most of the pre-distribution schemes makes is 
that the base station will be responsible for every key exchange which is an 
unrealistic assumption. Because in a real world sensor network, this base station 
might not be available at all times, especially not for each and every key 
exchange. 
 
From our survey we found that, homogeneous ad hoc networks have poor 
performance and scalability. Furthermore, many security schemes designed for 
homogeneous sensor networks suffer from high communication overhead, 
computation overhead, and high storage requirement. But recently deployed 
sensor network systems are increasingly following heterogeneous designs.  
 
The performance and the lifetime of WSN can be improved greatly by 
using heterogeneous sensor nodes instead of homogenous ones without 
significantly increasing the cost. That‟s why we have studied and analyzed few 
heterogeneous sensor networks as part of our thesis work. We have studied four 
heterogeneous key management schemes as our related work and found out the 
flaws and benefits. We will be discussing about these schemes in the next few 
sections of this chapter. 
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3.1 TLA: A Tow Level Architecture for Key Management in Wireless 
sensor Networks 
 
Boushra Maala, Hatem Bettahar and Hatem Bettahar [14] proposed a two 
level architecture for key management in WSN called TLA. 
 
They organized their proposed scheme into two layers. The first layer has 
only Normal nodes called Nn and the second layer has super nodes called Sn. To 
become a super node a sensor node should have several properties. It should 
have enough energy resources   to enhance its life time as long as possible. The 
super node will need a wide communication range to cover maximum number of 
Nn nodes in the sensor network and high processing capacity to facilitate 
processing of achieved data.  
 
Any Normal node or Nn in WSN periodically pick up sensing information 
and send them towards one of the Sn (Super node) in the second layer. The duty 
of a Super node is to collect sensing information from a set of Nn nodes, and 
then process these data‟s to achieve the intended results. Super nodes may also 
cooperate with each other to combine these calculated results. 
 
The authors in [14] proposed that the communications between normal 
nodes are also possible if the Sn nodes take the responsibility of conveying 
information between any two Nn nodes. Sn nodes also communicate with the 
central sink node to periodically send their final results. 
 
In the Key Distribution Model of this scheme the authors proposed to use 
a limited pairwise key scheme at the first level between Nn nodes and Sn nodes 
and a complete pairwise key distribution at the second level between Sn nodes.  
 
The scheme in [14] required that before deploying the nodes in the WSN, 
the right number of Sn nodes should be calculated in order to optimize the key 
storage overhead (KSO). They considered a WSN with N sensors divided into Ns 
Super nodes and Nn Normal nodes. It has been shown that In TLA, each Nn 
sensor stores only one key. On the other hand, a Sn sensor stores (ns −1). 
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pairwise keys shared with other Sn sensors in the network and (N−ns) /ns 
keys shared with its supervised children. As a result the number of stored keys in 
a Sn sensor is:  
KSn =                                                 (3.1) 
 
At ns = √N this function gets its minimum. So with √N Sn nodes in the 
WSN, the average number of stored keys by a Sn sensor is: 
 
                                             KSn = 2√N – 2.                                                   (3.1) 
 
After the Sensor nodes are configured properly and initialized with the 
right keys the sensors establishes secure channel with its neighbors. Each Sn 
sensor broadcasts a hello message which contains all the pairwise keys 
identifiers of its Nn children. When an Nn sensor receives a hello message, it 
verifies whether its key identifier is listed within the message or not. If the key 
identifier is listed, the Nn sensor responds back with an Acknowledgement (ACK) 
message and a secure channel is established using the shared pairwise key. To 
establish a Sn to Sn secure channels a full pairwise key scheme is used between 
all Sn sensors in the WSN. Super nodes exchanges hello and ACK messages 
between them to establish Sn to Sn secure channels. 
 
The analysis in this paper [14] shows that this scheme gives a good 
resistance degree compared to other key management schemes. By using a 
limited pairwise scheme at the Nn level, whenever an Nn sensor is compromised, 
only the concerned channel between this Nn sensor and its Sn parent will be 
revealed to the attacker. In the same way, when a Sn node is compromised it will 
have a localized impact since only the secured channels from and to this Sn 
node will be compromised. Another advantage of the TLA scheme is the 
optimized key storage overhead. 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Performance Evaluation of TLA 
For Sn nodes, each node should store 2√N−1 pair-wise keys to 
communicate with the Nn nodes in its group and with other Sn nodes in the 
WSN. However, for Nn nodes, each node needs only to store one key which is a 
pair-wise shared key to communicate with its Sn node. 
The Resistance Degree against node capture (RD) of a key distribution scheme 
is the ratio of non compromised links over the total network links when one 
sensor node of the WSN is compromised: 
 
RD = 1−                                                     (3.3) 
 
Where, NCL is the number of compromised links when one node is 
compromised, and NTL is the total number of available links  in the network.   
A link between two sensor nodes is considered as compromised if the associated 
encryption key is revealed. A scheme with a good resistance degree against 
node capture will have RD ≈ 1 meaning that capturing one sensor node will not 
compromise any secured channel in the WSN. This is the case of pair-wise 
schemes. In contrast, a scheme with a very bad resistance degree against node 
capture will have RD ≈ 0 meaning that capturing one sensor node will 
compromise all secured channels in the WSN. This is the case of Master key 
schemes. 
 
In TLA scheme, the total number of channels includes all pair-wise 
channels between all Sn nodes in the network and all pair-wise channels 
between each Sn node and Nn nodes of its cluster. As a result the total number 
of Link for TTL is: 
 
NTL=   +                                           (3.4) 
 
When a Sn node is compromised, all its pair-wise channels with Nn nodes 
inside its cluster and its pair-wise channels with other Sn nodes will be revealed. 
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On the other hand, when an Nn node is compromised only one channel will be 
compromised.  
 
 
This makes an average of compromised channels: 
 
NCL = 3.√N − 2.                                                  (3.5) 
 
Dividing this value by the total number of channels gives:  
 
RD = 1−                                                   (3.6) 
 
Comparing the Resistance Degree of their proposed scheme against three 
combined technique scheme like LEAP, ESA and EKMSH the authors showed 
that TLA gives a better resistance degree against node capture compared to all 
others. They also showed that TLA as the only scheme that gives a very good 
resistance degree against node capture while using a small key storage 
overhead. 
 
 
3.2 A Tree Based Approach for Secure Key Distribution in Wireless 
Sensor Networks  
 
This paper proposed by Michael Conrad, Erik Oliver Blaß and Martina 
Zitterbart [15] presents a new key distribution method in sensor networks. It 
shows that communication in sensor networks follows a certain tree-like scheme. 
They called this process aggregation. This paper [15] showed that if the sensors 
follow a tree like hierarchy it can not only be memory efficient and energy saving 
but also a secure key distribution is possible. On the other hand when new 
sensor nodes will join the network they will be able to autonomously share the 
keys they need to complete their operation. Unlike other works in wireless sensor 
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networks, this paper states that there is no need to distribute keys between 
random sensor nodes because in real-world sensor networks often communicate 
like a tree-like aggregation towards the sink. 
 
The authors of these papers [15] proposed that sensors nodes in a WSN 
can be divided into two types, normal nodes and aggregation nodes. Sensor 
nodes measure data and forward them towards a data sink. On the way to the 
sink data can be aggregated by so called aggregation nodes. These nodes are 
able to collect data from other sensors nodes and process them, for example 
computing a mean value and forward the aggregate to the sink. 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 3.1:Aggregated sensor structure 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1 shows an example network. Sensor nodes a and b measure  
the temperature in room 1 at different positions. And nodes c and d measure the 
temperature in room 2 respectively. The sink is however only interested in the 
mean temperature of the complete building. Therefore a tree-like scheme has to 
be established for sensor communication. Aggregation node x collects 
temperature measurements from nodes a and b and computes their mean value 
forwarding this to aggregation node z. Aggregation node y does the same for 
node c and d. Finally node z computes the mean temperature for the whole 
building, i.e. two rooms, and reports it to the sink. This communication scheme 
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forms a hierarchy, sensor nodes (vertexes) and communications paths (edges) 
form a graph, more precisely a tree. 
 
We can observe from the above scenario that sensor nodes do not have 
to communicate randomly with each other. Sensor node needs to exchange data 
only with its parent node in the tree structure. Therefore, it needs a shared key 
only with its parent or aggregation node. On the other hand Communication is 
unlikely to happen between nodes from other categories or between nodes within 
the same category. If needed, they might transport or forward data in multi -hop 
situations but there is no need for any end-to-end communication. 
 
Key distribution 
 
The authors of this paper [15] assumed that aggregation in sensor 
networks forms a complete binary tree. Before a new sensor joins the network, it 
must be paired by the user or a Master Device. The pairing is essential for the 
node to obtain its new position inside the aggregation tree, to identify the parent 
or the first aggregation node. 
 
 
 
Fig: 3.2 A sample aggregation tree 
 
Figure 3.2.2 shows a complete binary tree exists before a new node starts 
to join. This node is now paired by the user.  
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The user identifies, that this node will have to communicate with 
aggregation node 10 because of its use. For this the user assigns the new node 
a new ID node. As the new node will be a child of 10, ID node could be 20 or 21 
to comply with the binary tree scheme. As the new node is the first child of 10, it 
becomes 20. Now, 10 is the primary parent (p1) of 20. Furthermore the user 
computes a secondary parent P2 for 20 using:  
 
 
P2 =    (3.7) 
 
 
P2 for 20 is therefore node 11.The user cans now handout two tickets 
(including keys) to 20 that allow secure communication for 20 with 10 and 11. 
This can be done efficiently as each node in the network might share a pairwise 
different key with the user, thus allowing the user to securely access distinct 
nodes. 
 
 As 20 can now establish secure channels to parents 10 and 11, it will ask 
them, which other aggregation nodes are on the way to the sink 1. Even in the 
presence of one cheater 20 will come to know 5, 2 and 1. The next step is to 
build secure channels to these nodes by securely exchanging shared secrets 
with them, first of all with 5. The main idea is, that 20 generates a new key K and 
splits it into two parts K1 and K2, these parts are encrypted with the key for 10 or 
11 respectively and sent to 10 and 11 to forward them towards 5. As K1 is 
encrypted from 20 with the key shared with 10 only 10 can decrypt it. Then 10 
encrypt K1 with the secret key 10 shares with 5 and send the result to 5. On the 
other hand 11 do the same with K2. Finally 5 can decrypt both transmissions 
from 10 and 11 and restore K. As neither 10 nor 11 come to know the other part 
of K, K is finally secretly transmitted from 20 to 5 even in the presence of one 
malicious node. Also changing K1 or K2 maliciously would not help any node as 
this would only deny communication between 20 and 5, but impersonation 
attacks are not possible. To secure communication between 20 and 2 or 1, the 
same procedure can be repeated. 20 sends one half of the encryption key K to 
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10, the other one to 11. As the aggregation tree was build inductively both have 
already a secure channel to node 2 and can transfer their part of K to node 2 
directly (10s parents were 5 and 6). 
 
An analysis of this mechanisms complexity shows, that each setup of a 
secure communication channel only needs 4 symmetric encryptions and 4 
communication steps inside aggregation overlay, completely independent from 
the position of the new node inside the tree or the depth of the tree. Also each 
node has to store only keys from other nodes, which are absolutely necessary 
because of its mission. 
 
 
3.3 An Efficient Key Distribution Scheme for Heterogeneous Sensor 
Networks 
 
Sajid Hussain, Firdous Kausar and Ashraf Masood [16] proposed a 
Heterogeneous Sensor Network consists of a small number of powerful High-end 
sensors (H-sensors) and a large number of Low-end sensors (L-sensors) in 
which the more powerful H-sensors act as cluster heads (CHs).The advantage of 
Clustering of sensors is that it enables local data processing, which reduces 
communication load in the network as well as provide scalable solutions. 
 
Key Pre-Distribution Phase 
 
This scheme in [16] uses a key pool K consists of M different key chains. 
A key chain C is a subset of K. Each key chain is generated independently via a 
unique generation key and publicly known seed S by applying a keyed hash 
algorithm repeatedly. Publicly known seed value is same for every key chain.  
 
K = Co|C1| . . . |CM−1                     (3.8) 
 
The nth key of the key chain Ci is computed as:  
 
kCi, n = HASH n(S, gi)                                           (3.9) 
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The total number of keys in a key chain is N, where N =K/M. 
 
Before deploying the nodes, each node is loaded with its assigned key ring R, 
where R is the generation knowledge of a number of key chains.  Each L-sensor 
node is assigned with r randomly selected generation keys of corresponding key 
chains. From these r generation keys, r×N random keys can be ca lculated 
effectively.  Each H-sensor node is pre-loaded with S randomly selected 
generation keys of corresponding key chains, where S >> r. 
 
Cluster Formation Phase 
 
During the cluster formation phase, all H-sensors broadcast Hello 
messages to nearby L-sensors .The Hello message include the ID of the H-
sensor. The transmission range of the broadcast is large enough so that most L-
sensors can receive Hello messages from several H-sensors. Then each L-
sensor selects the H-sensor whose Hello message has the best signal noise ratio 
(SNR) as the cluster head. Each L-sensor also records other H-sensors from 
which it receives the Hello messages, and these H-sensors are listed as backup 
cluster heads in case the primary cluster head fails. The H-sensor acts as a 
cluster head (CH), and the L-sensors act as cluster members. 
 
Cluster head based Shared Key Discovery Phase 
 
After cluster formation is done the shared key discovery phase begins. 
Each cluster member sends a message to its cluster head, which includes its ID,  
the ids of the generation keys, and its neighboring nodes information. Some L-
sensors may not share any pre-loaded generation key with their neighbors. For 
each pair of L-sensors that do not share any generation key, CH generates a 
pair-wise key for each pair (X and Y), and securely sends the key to them. 
 
Performance Evaluation 
 
This paper in [16] proposed a key distribution scheme for heterogeneous 
sensor networks based on random key predistribution. In this scheme, in place of 
storing all the assigned Keys in a sensor node, they stored a small number of 
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generation keys. As a result it can significantly reduce the storage requirements 
as compared to other random key pre-distribution schemes. The analysis In this 
paper showed that requirements can be reduced by 8 times as compared to AP 
[17], and 33 times as compared to basic scheme [18]. 
If p is the probability that an L-sensor and H-sensor share at least one common 
key in their key ring, then the number of possible key ring assignment for an L-
sensor is: 
                                                        (3.10) 
 
The number of possible key ring assignment for an H-sensor is  
 
                          (3.11) 
 
The total number of possible key ring assignment for an L-sensor and H-sensor 
is 
                                              (3.12) 
 
The probability that an L-sensor and H-sensor share a common key can be given 
as 
 
                                         (3.13) 
 
The analysis of this  paper showed that where basic scheme needs 100 
keys[5] and AP scheme needs 20[17] the same probability of key sharing among 
nodes can be achieved by just loading 2 generation keys in sensor node for this 
scheme. 
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For instance, if there are 1000 L-sensors and 10 H-sensors in an HSN, 
where each L-sensor is pre-loaded with 2 generation keys and each H-sensor is 
pre-loaded with 100 generation keys, the total memory requirement for this 
proposed scheme is 2×1000+100×10=3000 (in the unit of key length). However, 
in AP scheme [17], if each H-sensor is loaded with 500 keys and each L-sensor 
is loaded with 10keys, the total memory requirement for storing these keys will be 
500×10+1000×20=25,000, which is 8 times larger than our proposed scheme. 
Further, for a homogeneous sensor network with 1000 L-sensors, where each L-
sensor is pre-loaded with 100 keys, the memory requirements will be 
100×1000=100,000, which is 33 times larger than our proposed scheme.  
 
Security Evaluation 
 
In this scheme, If there are n compromised nodes, the probability that a 
given key is not compromised is (1− r M) n. The probability of total number of 
compromised keys, where n number of L-sensors is captured, is as follows: has 
knowledge of r×N keys. The probability that  
 
                                              (3.14) 
 
For a given parameters: M=1000, K=50,000, r=5, and m=100, the results 
show that when the compromised communication is 100 percent for basic 
scheme, the proposed scheme has compromised communication of only 12 
percent. 
 
 
3.4 LEAP: Efficient security for large-scale WSNs 
 
Hierarchical Key management for WSN is often known as LEAP. This 
scheme was proposed by Zhu, Setia, and Jajodia [19]. The authors of this 
scheme believe that different types of messages exchanged between nodes 
need to have different security requirements .The packets received by a node 
should always be authenticated and the packets transmitted by a node should 
always be encrypted to meet the security requirements. Zhu, Setia, and Jajodia 
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[19] used four types of keys in Leap to handle different types of packets. There 
four types of keys that must be stored in each sensor: individual, pairwise, 
cluster, and group. 
 
Individual key:  
 
A unique key that is shared between the base station and each sensor node is 
called Individual key. Sensor nodes use this key to calculate the MACs on their 
messages to the base station like alert signals. In the same way, a base station 
can use it to send messages to each and every node in the network. 
 
Pairwise shared key:   
 
This is a unique key which is shared each node and its neighboring node. 
A node can use it to transfer individual messages like sharing a cluster key or 
sending data to an aggregator node. 
 
Cluster key:  
 
This is a key that is shared between a node and its neighboring nodes. A 
node may decide not to send a message to the base station if its neighboring 
node is sending the same message with a better signal. This discovery is only 
possible to implement if a node shares a common key with its neighboring nodes. 
With such a cluster key, a node can select which messages to transfer which can 
reduce the communication overhead. 
 
Group key:  
 
The base station shares this key with all the nodes in the network to send 
queries to them. Group key used requires an efficient rekeying mechanism for 
updating it as there is a chance for an adversary to know the key whenever a 
node is compromised. 
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Establishing individual keys: 
 
Before a node is deployed in the sensor network each node is pre-loaded 
with a unique key that it shares with the base station. For example, the individual 
key  for node U is calculated as: 
 
 =                                                  (3.15) 
 
  Here, f is a pseudo-random function and  is the master key known only 
to the controller or base station. The base station do not need to store all the 
individual keys, because the base station can generates them on the fly 
whenever it attempts to communicate with a node. The base station can give 
these keys to the individual nodes.  
 
 Establishing pairwise shared keys: 
 
Pairwise key is shared between each node and its neighbor. There should 
be a way so that the neighbors can identify each other when deployed in the 
network as they do not have any pre-deployed information. Whenever a node is 
deployed in a WSN, it requires some minimum time to identify neighbors and 
establish keys with them, which will be test. It is assumed that the node cannot 
be compromised before that tome. 
 
There are four stages that represent the key establishment of new node U 
deployed in the network: 
 
 key pre-distribution 
 neighbor discovery 
  pairwise key establishment 
  Key erasure 
 
During the initial stage of key predistribution, node U is loaded with the 
key Ki by the controller and derives the master key Ku using it.  
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For neighbor discovery, node U first initializes a timer to activate at timer, 
.Then it starts communicating with its neighbors by broadcasting a HELLO 
message containing its ID. Node V responds to this message with a reply 
containing its own ID. The acknowledgement (ACK) of V is then authenticated 
using its master key Kv derived from Ki. Node U verifies the authentication of V 
by generating the master key Kv as node V shares Ki with it:  
 
U ->*: U and V -> U: V, MAC (Kv, U|V)                            (3.16) 
 
For the third stage of pairwise key establishment, node U computes the 
pairwise key Kuv with node V using V‟s identity. Node V can also do the same 
thing with U. There is no need for authenticating node U to V as any future 
messages authenticated with Kuv will prove node U‟s identity. 
 
In the fourth and final stage is key erasure, where node U erases K i and 
all the master keys of the other nodes after the time expires. Then node U will not 
be able to establish pairwise keys with any other nodes in the WSN so that, 
though an adversary captures a node, the communications between it and 
another node cannot be decrypted without the key K i. 
 
Establishing cluster keys:  
 
The cluster key establishment is based on the pairwise key establishment. 
If node U wants to establish a cluster key with its neighbor‟s v1, v2, v3,…... ,vn, first 
it generates a key Kc and then encrypts that key using the pairwise key which it 
shares with each neighbor. Node U then transmits this encrypted message to its 
neighbors. Node v1 decrypts the key using the pairwise key which it shares with 
U, and then stores the key in a buffer. Next it sends back its own cluster key to 
node U. When any of the nodes are revoked, node U generates a new cluster 
key in the same way and transmits the key to all remaining nodes. 
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Establishing group keys:  
 
A group key is shared between a base station and all the nodes in a WSN. 
When the base station wants to send a message or query to all the nodes of that 
WSN it uses the group key.  
 
One way of broadcasting messages by the base station can be done by 
using the hop-by-hop method in which the base station can encrypts messages 
using the cluster key which it shares with its neighbors and then broadcasts the 
message to all the nodes in its neighborhood. The nodes would decrypt the 
message and then encrypt it using the cluster key which they share with their 
neighbors. In this way, the message can be received by all the nodes in the 
network. This is efficient, but has an overhead of encryption and decryption at 
every node. 
 
A simple method to establish a group key is to preload each node with the 
group key before deployment, but this is still within the scope for rekeying the 
group key which will be necessary. Unicast-based group rekeying can also be 
considered for which the base station needs to send the group key to each node 
in the network, but this involves much communication overhead. However, Zhu, 
Setia, and Jajodia [19] proposed an efficient scheme based on c luster keys in 
which the transmission cost will only be one key. 
 
Local broadcast authentication: 
 
In local broadcast a node generally does not know what packet it is going 
to generate next and messages generally consist of aggregated sensor readings 
or routing protocols. In case of local broadcast authentication is needed 
immediately. For local broadcast, One-Way Key Chain-Based Authentication is 
used. This scheme is based on µTESLA in that each node generates a one-way 
key chain and sends the commitment of it to their neighbors. This Transferring is 
done using the pairwise keys already shared with neighbors. If a node wants to 
send a message to its neighbors, it attaches the next authorization key from its 
key chain to the message. The receiving node can verify the validation of the key 
based on the commitment it has already received. The One-Way Key Chain-
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Based Authentication is designed based on two observations: a node only needs 
to authenticate to its neighbors and that a node V will receive a packet before a 
neighboring X receives it and resends it to V. This observation is true because of 
the triangular inequality among the distances of nodes involved. An adversary 
may still try to attack the nodes by shielding node V while U is transmitting a 
message, and then later send a modified packet to V with the same authorization 
key; but this attack can be prevented by combining the authorization keys with 
the cluster keys. When this is done, the adversary does not have the cluster key 
and so cannot impersonate node U. However, this scheme does not provide a 
solution for attacks from inside where the adversary knows U‟s cluster key.   
 
Evaluation if the Scheme 
 
Computation cost: 
 
 Computation cost depends on the number of encryption and decryption. If 
the size of network is M, total number of encryption is M and total number of 
decryption is M and if the density of network is d, in [6] it has been stated that the 
average number of symmetric operations of the scheme is about 
 
2(d -1)2/ (N -1) + 2                                            (3.17) 
 
Communication cost:  
 
The communication cost also depends on the density of network. The 
average communication cost is (d -1)2/ (N -1) + 2 for this scheme.  
 
Storage Cost: 
 
 The storage requirement of LEAP depends upon the density of the 
network. The storage requirement of this scheme is a bit high because each 
node must store four types of keys in it. Considering the degree of node to be d, 
a node has to store one individual key, d pairwise keys, the cluster keys, and one  
group key. Also, a node must store a one-way key chain and a commitment for 
each neighbor for local broadcast. If L is the number of keys stored in a key 
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chain, the total number of keys the node has to store in this scheme will be 3d + 
2 + L. 
 
Security: 
 
LEAP is an efficient scheme for key establishment that resists many types 
of attacks on the network, including the Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, wormhole 
attack, and so on. LEAP also provides efficient schemes for node revocation and 
key updating in WSNs. 
 
Benefits of this scheme: 
 
 LEAP supports various communication patterns, including unicast 
(addressing a single node), local broadcast (addressing a group of nodes 
in a neighborhood), and global broadcast (addressing all the nodes in a 
WSN). 
 
 LEAP provides survivability such that compromising of some nodes does 
not cede the entire network. 
 
 LEAP is energy efficient since it supports techniques like In-network 
Processing and Passive Participation that greatly reduce network 
communication overhead and, in turn, increase node battery life. 
 
 In final stage of key establishment, I ,master keys of all node are erased 
after tmin time expires so that even if a node gets captured by adversary, 
the communication between it and other nodes can‟t be decrypted without 
the key Ki.  
 
 One of the unique advantages of the scheme above is that once pairwise 
keys are established between neighboring nodes in an area of a WSN, 
they cannot be established again, which protects the network from clone 
attacks. 
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 There is no need for the base station to store all the individual keys, 
because the base station generates them on the fly whenever it attempts 
to communicate with a node. 
 
Flaws of the scheme: 
 
 Disadvantages of this scheme include that it requires excessive storage 
with each node storing four types of keys and a one-way key chain 
 
 Computation and communication overhead dependent upon network  
Density (the denser a network, the more overhead it has). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
CHAPTER IV 
OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction To Our Scheme 
 
In our thesis, we are proposing a tree based key management scheme for 
Heterogeneous WSN, often known as HSN. A HSN consists of a small number of 
powerful high-end sensors (H-sensors) and a large number of low-end sensors 
(L-sensors). H sensors are more powerful nodes with more storage capability, 
computation, communication and energy supply. L-sensors are ordinary sensor 
nodes with limited computation, communication, energy supply and storage 
capability. Sensor nodes are assumed to be immobile; these nodes organize 
themselves into clusters. The size of the cluster we are assuming here is a small 
group of sensor nodes. The size of cluster depends on the network density.   
 
Here, hierarchical architecture of sensor networks is considered, where 
data is routed from sensor nodes to base station through cluster heads. Cluster 
head are H-sensors who are responsible for its cluster‟s security which 
comprises of many L-sensors.  
 
In such network the role of Base station is to interfaces sensor network to 
the outside network. A cluster head is chosen from each cluster to handle the 
communication between the cluster nodes and the base station. Our proposed 
scheme proposes method that talks about different issues like addition of new 
nodes, key renewal when a node is compromised and key refresh at regular 
intervals in order to achieve key freshness.  
 
In this scheme well established security is achieved as it‟s our main 
priority. In this tree based key management schemes each user shares a key 
called private key with the key server and key at the root of the tree is the group 
key which is shared by all users in the group. Other keys (other than private key 
and group key) are called auxiliary keys which are known only for certain subset 
of users and are used to encrypt new group key whenever there is a group 
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membership change. Overall all the keys are referred as Key Encryption Keys 
(KEK). Whenever a node is compromised new group key (PK‟) is distributed to 
other nodes using one way hash functions and simple XOR operations. 
 
Our scheme uses m-ary tree and at each level m KEK are maintained. 
Since m-ary tree is used we are reducing number of levels of the tree which 
reduces storage of each sensor. Other schemes like the scheme of I.Chang, 
R.Engel, D.Kandlur, D.Pendarakis and D.Daha (1999) [20] has storage of O (log2 
N) .In our scheme at every level we are maintaining only m keys so which 
reduces server side storage to O (logm N). In [20] binary tree structure is used. 
When the cluster size is large, the number of levels  in the binary tree will be more 
which increases number of keys to be stored by each sensor node. Extending 
the scheme to m-ary tree will reduce the height of the tree reducing number of 
keys at each sensor node.  Since encryptions are replaced by hash functions and 
simple XOR operations, computation and communication cost incurred will also 
be reduced when compared to exsisting scheme in [20]. 
 
4.2  Key Establishment Between H-sensor And L-sensors 
 
Figure 4.1: B+ m-ary tree of key encryption key (KEK) 
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Initially all H-sensors are pre loaded with their own ID, function f (used to 
authenticate L sensors) and initial key Ki. And L-sensors are preloaded with their 
own ID, function f (used to authenticate cluster head), and initial key  Ki . The 
function f is used for key generation and authentication purpose hence it‟s a 
common function between all sensors. 
 
After deployment all H-sensors broadcast an encryption advertisement 
message (adv) (encrypted using K i ) containing its ID and random key (IDCH, KCH) 
to inform the whole network. Only L-sensors with  Ki is only able to decrypt the 
message. Each genuine L-sensor will reply back to the H-sensor whose Hello 
message has the best signal noise ratio and select it to be its cluster head.  
 
To join the H-sensor (named CH) with the best Hello message, L-sensor 
(named Ai) will use key function f and  KCH  to generate  KAiCH. Then Ai will send 
a join message (join) encrypted with K i .The message consists of a tuple as 
<IDAi. KAiCH> to CH and make the message as its initialization key.  
 
So we can say now that CH has received nodes Ai's join messages 
protected by Ki. At the same time, CH decrypts all the messages from all other L-
sensors, willing to join its cluster , and collect all their ID and keys.Then  CH 
creates index of binary string of length x (x=log2NOpt) and assign to each node.  
After that CH generates a B+ tree-based key structure using the dual-data, 
according to the sort of keys‟ value it assigns keys for each node in the tree. 
Finally creation of the B+ tree is completed in the CH-sensor. The degree of the 
B+ tree depends on the optimum size of network.Maximum degree of b+ tree for 
a preferred height of h is, 
 
h=logmNopt 
mh   =Nopt (Nopt is the optimum no. of nodes that can be deployed in an 
area) 
hlog2m=log2Nopt 
m=2 (log2Nopt)/h 
 
For each node,Ai, CH sends a join-reply message, encrypted  with K i, 
back to Ai. The join-reply message consists of receiving nodes id and all the KEK 
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along the path from leaf to root of the B+ tree.Refering to the figure (4.1), CH 
sends < IDAi, K0,K0-2, PK>  to Ai,where K0   is private key,K0-2 auxilary key and PK 
is the group key. If we look into details, actually each of the keys(K0,K0-2 and PK) 
is sent separately in messages encrypted by  Ki. 
 
After joining a cluster, an L sensor undergoes key erasure. That is it remembers 
its KEK, function f and it‟s ID. It no longer remembers the key K i. 
 
As we consider Base station to be an entity with huge resource and is fully 
in our control that is it cannot undergo any kind of attack. Thus to maintain proper 
control of the network, the entire network is divided into clusters. The size of 
cluster depends on total network density. The base station must have full access 
to each cluster. Rather than maintaining separate connection with each sensor, 
to reduce storage and communication overhead, Base Station keeps itself 
connects to each cluster head (H-sensors).Thus once the cluster is formed, the 
CH send the application messages (app) to BS to establish secure links between 
CHs and BS. And the second level B+ tree will be established simultaneity. 
 
The second level key tree establishment is similar to the process as the 
first level key tree. Firstly, the cluster head sends join application message, 
encrypted by  Ki., to base station and the message consists of a tuple as <IDCH, 
KCH > where IDCH is the CH „s ID and  KCH is its initialization keys which will be 
exchanged. When BS receives the application messages, it generates the B+ 
tree similar to the first level key tree found in the cluster heads. Then, from the 
B+ tree key pool Group Key for Cluster Head CH, BCHK , along with other 
auxilary key will be sent to it by Base Station in an encrypted message.  
 
 In order to achieve key freshness, it is required for the Base Station to 
change PK and BCHK to PK‟ and BCHK' periodically or whenever needed. The 
cluster key PK is changed to PK' by respective cluster heads and is distributed 
securely to nodes in the cluster by hash function that will be soon described. 
Similarly base station will change BCHK to BCHK' and distributes it to all cluster 
heads securely by using hash function. 
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4.3  Key Establishment Among L-sensors 
 
L-sensors can communicate with each other only after they have joined a 
cluster under a cluster head and obtained group key PK. Group key PK is the 
only key encryption key that is common between all nodes under a cluster head. 
Each L-sensor Lu can use PK and function f to generate its master key 
KLu=fPK(IDLu). And then node Lu broadcasts an advertisement message (IDLu, 
Nonceu), encrypted using PK,which contains a nonce and waits for each 
neighbor Lv to reply. And then Lv replies to Lu with an encrypted message by PK 
and the message contains   <IDLv, PK(IDLv|Nonce Lu)>. 
 
Simultaneously, Lv can also generate the key KLv = f PK (IDLv) .And then 
both nodes Lu and Lv can generate the pair-wise key KLuv= fKLv(IDLu) . Each 
node can use these nodes‟ ID to calculate its neighbor nodes‟ key, that is, every 
node can be authenticated by its immediate nodes. If there are some malicious 
nodes, for example, the adversaries‟ nodes, they can be distinguished by this 
approach. 
 
This part of the communication is mainly done to provide initial security. 
During the above mentioned authentication process, if nodes under a cluster 
determines presence of malicious node trying to enter cluster, then they will 
inform cluster head which in turn will update group key PK. The process of 
rekeying will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
4.4  Key Renewal (referring to figure 4.1) 
 
Since in our scheme sensor nodes are immobile, the two-level key 
establishment technique does not have to consider deployment knowledge of 
others before node deployment. When an adversary obtains a sensor node, it is 
assumed that the node cannot be compromised before time tmin. Whenever a 
node is deployed in a WSN, it requires some minimum time to identify neighbors 
and establish keys with them, which will be test. In our scheme we assume that 
tmin > test. 
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We assume that we have intrusion detection mechanism to detect node 
compromise. As soon as a node is compromised corresponding cluster head will 
change all the keys that are known to compromised node (i.e. all the KEK along 
the path from leaf to root of the B+ tree). The changed keys are distributed 
securely to existing nodes. For e.g. if say node s4 is compromised, keys k4-7   
and PK are changed k4-7‟ and PK'.  
 
For key renewal our scheme follows a simple computation shown below: 
 
F(auxiliary key, new group key) < − (Auxiliary key) XOR (New Group key)  (4.1) 
 
For  each node we assume that it has the capability to compute a one-way 
hash function G as discussed in „N.F.P.180-1. Secure hash standard‟ (1994) [21] 
and by R.Rivest.(1992) [22]. We also assume each node is able to update 
auxiliary keys after getting new group key using the function F as shown in 
equation (4.1). For nodes not along the path of compromised node needs to 
refresh only PK to PK‟ but nodes along the path of the  compromised node needs 
to refresh all the keys that it had in common with the compromised node. 
Therefore referring to above diagram S5,S6 and S7 needs both PK‟ and K5-7‟ and 
rest will be distributed with only PK‟. Then the compromised node s4 will not 
share any common key with the entire cluster thus rest of the network is secure 
and remains connected. 
 
We will now elaborate how new group key PK‟ and K5-7‟ is distributed to 
the remaining group members (i.e., nodes) using the simple computation shown 
in equation (4.1).  
 
At first the compromised auxilary key will be updated to K5-7‟ .For s5 
Cluster Head, CH, computes the hash of key k5 i.e., G(k5) and XOR‟s this with 
new group key  K5-7‟  which yields K
s5<- (G(k5)) XOR  (K5-7‟). Upon receiving this 
message nodes  s5 (knowing key  k5) compute G(k5) and XOR‟s with  K
s5  to get 
new group key  K5-7‟ (i.e., K5-7‟  <-  (K
s5 ) XOR (G(k5)) ).Similarly the new K5-7‟ is 
distributed to s6 and  s7. 
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To communicate new group key PK‟  to nodes s0, . . . , s3,CH computes 
the hash of key k10 i.e., G(k10) and XOR‟s this with new group key PK‟ which 
yields Ks0,...,s3   <-(G(k0-3)) XOR (PK‟) .Upon receiving this message nodes s0, . . . 
, s3 (knowing key k0-3) compute G(k0-3) and XOR‟s with K 
s0,...,s3 to get new group 
key PK‟  (i.e., PK‟ <-(K s0,...,s3)  XOR (G(k 0-3)) ). 
   
Similarly messages sent by CH to existing group members are Ks8,...,s11<- 
(G(k 8-11)) XOR (PK‟), K 
s12,...,s15<- G(k 12-15) XOR PK‟ and    K 
s5,...,s7 <- (G(K5-7‟  )) 
XOR PK‟. The nodes will compute the new group key PK‟ by XORing received  
message with the hash of the keys known to them. Group key PK‟ computed by 
nodes s8, . . . , s11 is PK‟  <-( K s 8,...,s11 ) XOR (G(k8-11)), for nodes s12, . . . , s15 
it is PK‟<-(Ks12,...,s15  )XOR (G(k12-15)) and , for node s5 to s7 PK‟<- (K
s5-7 ) 
XOR(G(K5-7‟  )). The keys that are known to compromised nodes s4 are k4, k4-7 
and PK.  
 
In the messages that are sent in clear by CH to group members by using 
the hash of the encryption keys, none of the messages uses any of the keys that 
are known to compromised nodes. Hence using the keys of the compromised 
nodes it is not possible to get any information regarding new group key.  
 
In this method if two L-sensors with two different keys kx and kx‟ receive 
the same secret key in two individual communications, they can compute the 
hash of the other. For e.g., a node say Ux having kx can recover  G(kx‟ ) as 
follows : G(kx‟ )<- ( (G(kx‟)) XOR (knew ) )XOR(knew ) where knew  is known to the 
node Ux (secret sent in earlier communication) and „G(kx‟ ) XOR ( knew )‟ is 
eavesdropped. Using this hash, i.e. G(kx‟ ), node Gx can decrypt the secret 
intended only for nodes having key kx‟ that is sent in next communication. To 
avoid this every key that is hashed in the current communication is incremented 
by 1 and then used to take next hash value for next communication (i.e., kx‟ <-   
kx‟ +1 ) and then hashed to send next secret key. It is computationally infeasible 
for a user during the ith application of this method to recover k x‟+i even given 
G(k x‟+i), . . . G(ks‟). 
 
Therefore in order to avoid attackers decrypting any message in the next 
time interval we perform two operations. First, each remaining node along the 
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path from the leaving point will compute new auxiliary key using the equation 
(4.1). Second, every key used to compute the hash value is incremented by 1. In 
this scheme to communicate new group key securely we are not using any 
encryption instead all communications are by using hash values and XOR 
operations which will reduce the communication overhead i.e., rekeying cost is 
reduced. 
 
Whenever a new node is added to network, the cluster head will find an 
appropriate position for the new node in the tree and tree is updated (i.e., all the 
keys along the path including the cluster key are changed). Cluster head will now 
distribute new PK‟ to previous nodes and the new node will receive all the keys 
along the path. In order to distribute the changed keys securely cluster head 
uses private key of the new node and for other nodes it uses previous cluster 
key. 
 
So overall this is the scheme that we will like to propose as an 
enhancement of existing heterogeneous tree based key management schemes. 
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CHAPTER V 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we have evaluated and compared the performance of our 
scheme of in terms of key Storage overhead, communication overhead, 
computation overhead and resiliency to attack. 
 
5.1  KEY STORAGE OVERHEAD 
 
 
 
Our proposed Scheme ensures strong authenticity through the key 
encryption keys we have introduced. The size of the pool of Key Encryption Keys 
is relatively so large that overhead of storing few functions and few other 
preloaded keys can be ignored. In our scheme, we define the Key Storage 
Overhead (KSO) as the number of keys stored by each sensor in the Wireless 
Sensor Network. Here, the key storage overhead depends on the type of the 
sensor node. 
 
Since the H-sensors are nodes with higher capability they can store huge 
number of key‟s as required by the scheme. At the initial setup phase, after the 
cluster has been formed, each H sensor builds a B+ tree of KEK‟s. Storage in our 
system depends on the degree and height of the B+ tree. For H-sensor nodes 
each node need to store i number of keys. However, for L-sensor nodes, 
Figure: 5.1:key storage tree 
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each node needs only to store the key encryption key‟s which are on the path 
from leaf (position of the L-sensor node in the tree) to node of the B+ tree.  
 
In Figure 5.1 the B+ tree is a 4-ary tree. The root of the B+ tree is the 
Cluster key which is shared by all the L-sensors under this cluster. At level 0 the 
number of KEK is 40 =1 key (Cluster key, PK). Then at level 1, number of KEK is 
41 =4 keys and at Level 2 the number is 42 =16.So total no of KEK is 
1+4+16=21.Thus generalizing the concept, total number of KEK is 
 
m0 + m1 +m0 + m2 = i                     (5.1) 
 
Therefore total number of Key storage overhead for H-sensor is, 
 
KEK total= m
0 + m1 +m0 + m2 = i                                      (5.2) 
 
 
From our previous discussion in our scheme we know that every L-sensor 
node will store all the keys along the path from leaf to root of the B+ tree. 
Therefore total number of Key storage overhead for each H-sensor is, 
 
KEK total = height of the tree= logmn.                       (5.3)
 
 
 
At first, we compared our scheme with few basic pre-distribution schemes 
like random pairwise in [23], trivial pairwise in [24], closest pairwise in [25] 
schemes. From figure: 5.2, we can see that for a network with 600 nodes, KSO 
for random pairwise scheme is 198.For trivial solution its 566 and for closest 
pairwise scheme its 200 keys per node. Where in case of our scheme for 
minimum height h=3 and m=8 the H-sensor needs to store only 73 and the L 
sensor only 3 keys. 
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Figure5.1:Comparing our scheme with different homogeneous network for N=600 
 
Now if we compare our scheme to other schemes which we have studied 
as our related work like Sajid et.al. Scheme in [16] for a network of 1000 L-
sensor and 10 H-sensor, we observe that in Sajid et.al. , for a key sharing 
probability of 0.5 each L-sensor stores 2 generation keys and H-sensor stores 
approximately 100 generation keys. When the key sharing probability is 0.8 L-
sensor stores 5 generation keys and H-sensor approximately 250 generation 
keys. For the Asymmetric pre-distribution the key Storage overhead is 500. 
 
Similarly, we compared our scheme with another related work called 
LEAP in [19] for a 1000 nodes and found that for d=10 (d is the number of 
neighbors) where LEAP needs to store 203 KEK per node While in case of our 
scheme with a minimum height of 3 of the B+ tree and m=10, the cluster head 
needs to store i=111 KEK each L sensor needs to store only  =3 
KEKs. We can see the differences from between the compared schemes from 
figure: 5.3. 
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Figure: 5. 2: Comparing our scheme with related works for N=1000 
 
Thus it is clear that as per key storage overhead our scheme has less storage.  
 
 
5.2 Communication 
 
Communication cost is measured in terms of number of messages needed 
to be exchanged in order to update the existing keys as a result of events like: 
addition of new node, node compromise and key refresh at regular intervals. For 
events like node addition and node compromise, numbers of key changes varies 
from 1 to log m n. 
 
The changed cluster key and other intermediate keys are encrypted using 
the appropriate keys. The number of messages constructed and communicated 
varies from one to log m n. Therefore, communication at H-sensor vary from one 
to logmn transmit operations. Similarly each L-sensor performs either one or 
logmn receives operations.  
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For key refresh at regular intervals the new cluster key is encrypted using 
old cluster key and is sent to other sensors. Hence each H-sensor performs one 
transmit operations and L-sensor one receive operation in order to update the 
cluster key. 
 
The communication cost incurred for the scheme as Sajid‟s scheme [16] is 
as follows: to collect neighboring node information each node communicates with 
every neighbor node. Each node performs p receive operations if p nodes are in 
the communication range. After collecting neighboring node information each L-
sensor transmits it to H-sensor, in turn H-sensor selects a key and transmits it to 
L-sensor individually; for a group of n L-sensors, number of transmit and receive 
operations performed by H-sensor are 2n. L-sensors required to perform p+1 
receive operations (p to collect neighbor node information and one to receive 
selected key from H-sensor) and two transmit operations (one initially sent to 
neighboring nodes and second transmit to send the collected information to H-
sensor). Fig: 5.4 show us the difference between these two schemes in terms of 
communication cost. 
 
 
 
 
Figure : 5.4: Comparing communication overhead 
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5.3 Computation overhead 
 
Computation costs are measured in terms of number of encryptions 
required to change the keys in the event of node compromise and node addition. 
Here we consider computation cost at both H-sensor and L-sensors for node 
addition and node compromise separately. When a node is added H-sensor has 
to update the tree by changing all the keys along the path from joining point till 
the root. After updating the tree new set of keys are encrypted using appropriate 
keys in order to distribute changed keys to the existing nodes as well as new 
node securely. Number of encryptions performed when a node is added is: to 
distribute new cluster key PK' to all the nodes except new node it is encrypted 
using old cluster key PK. New keys along the path from joining point till the root 
are encrypted using respective old intermediate keys and distributed to 
respective set of nodes. To distribute all the keys along the path to the new node 
the keys are encrypted using node's private key. Total number of enc ryptions 
performed by cluster head (H-node) in case of node addition is m*(h-1) where h 
is the tree height. For node addition computation with respect to L-sensor not in 
the path of the joining node is one i.e., decrypting the new cluster key which is 
encrypted by cluster head using old cluster key. For the L-sensor in the path of 
joining node computation is equal to (h-1) decryptions. 
 
When a single node is compromised, keys along the path are changed 
and distributed securely to other nodes by the cluster head which maintains the 
tree. For the L-sensors along the path of the compromised node intermediate 
keys as well as cluster key will change where as for other L-sensors only cluster 
key is changed. Total number of encryptions required in case of node 
compromise is dependent on the position of the compromised node in the B+ 
tree. From analysis we have calculated that maximum number of encryption is 
required when only one node is compromised in each sub array. As the number 
of compromised node increases in each sub-array, number of encryption 
required to refresh the keys reduces. The maximum number of encryption 
required for key renewal when only one node is compromised in the network is:  
 
              (5.4) 
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Where N is the total number of node sunder a cluster, m is degree of the tree and 
h is the height of the B+ tree. 
 
As the value of m increases total number of encryption for key renewal 
reduces. We have compared the communication overhead of our scheme with 
sajid‟s scheme [16].  
 
 
 
 
Figure: 5.5 Comparing computation cost with leap  
 
When we compared the computation cost of our scheme which is 
maximum when one node is compromised with Leap [19] and we found that for 
Leap where the cost is 2*n for refreshing the group key and cluster key , in our 
scheme the maximum cost is much less. We can see the difference from the 
figure 5.5 
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5.4 Security Analysis 
 
In our previous chapters we have talked about the major security attacks 
in wireless sensor networks. In this section we have shown that our scheme is an 
efficient scheme for key establishment that resists many types of attacks on the 
network, including the Denial of service, Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, wormhole, 
and so on. LEAP in [19] also provides efficient schemes for node revocation and 
key updating in WSNs 
 
Denial of Service: 
 
DoS attack tries to exhaust the resources available to the victim sensor 
node by sending extra unnecessary packets and prevents. The mechanisms to 
prevent DoS attacks include payment for network resources, pushback, strong 
authentication and identification of traffic. Our scheme can prevent DoS attack as 
provides Strong authentication at every stage of network communication through 
the key encryption keys. Before any kind of communication between two nodes a 
secured channel is established through authentication. Moreover each packet is 
send or received through key encryption and decryption   for verification.  
 
An L-sensor in our network communicates with only one H-sensor which it 
selects as its cluster head .It uses the pre-deployed common key for 
authentication while joining the cluster. And again when exchanging messages 
between them it uses the key encryption keys provided by the Cluster head. On 
the other hand, an L-sensor only communicates to those other L sensor nodes 
within its cluster to which it shares a common cluster key and can  establish a 
pairwise key Kuv  . 
 
We can see that sensor nodes do not receive and process packets from 
nodes which are not trusted. Thus the exhaustion of network by processing of 
extra unnecessary packets cannot be done here. 
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Attack on Information in transit:  
 
Wireless communication is vulnerable to eavesdropping. Any attacker can 
monitor the traffic flow and get into action to interrupt, intercept, modify or 
fabricate packets and provide wrong information to the base stations or sinks. 
 
In our scheme, while communicating between L-sensors authentication is 
done by function f and PK and messages are encrypted using Kuv. While 
Communication is between H-L-sensors, any message is encrypted logmn times 
by KEK.  
 
Sybil Attack:  
 
In our scheme even if Id of a node is obtained by malicious node it cannot 
communicate with other nodes without obtaining PK  or f as, thus Sybil attack 
cannot be performed. Instead the nodes will info rm the H-sensor about the 
presence of malicious node and overall key renewal will take place in order to 
reinforce security. 
 
Black hole or sinkhole attack: 
 
In the sinkhole attack, a compromised node attracts packets by 
advertising information like high battery power, etc., and then later drops all the 
packets. 
 
In our scheme, H-L sensor communication is strongly protected by  
no. of KEK. Here H-sensor only communicates with those L-sensor that are in its 
cluster .Thus it will not trust any other nodes outside its network or with malicious 
behavior for best path or highest quality .Moreover if a node is compromised all 
the key encryption keys are refreshed and communication channels between L 
sensors are re-established using new cluster key PK . As a result it would not be 
possible for a compromised node to affect the network with sinkhole attack.  
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Hello Flood Attack:  
 
Our scheme can also prevent a HELLO attack in which an adversary 
attacks the network by repeatedly transmitting HELLO messages and thereby 
depletes the network‟s resources. This attack is averted since the nodes in our 
scheme accept packets only from authenticated neighbors. In our scheme both 
H-sensor and L-sensors are pre-deployed with key K i  .Initial broadcast by H-
sensors are encrypted this key K i  .When an L-sensor gets HELLO packet from 
any other sensor node it can verify whether the node is authenticated using this 
pre-deployed key. So malicious hello broadcast can be detected ted by L-
sensors thus Hello Flood Attack cannot occur. 
 
Wormhole attack: 
 
In the wormhole attack an adversary launches two nodes in the network, 
one near the target of interest and the other near the base station. The adversary 
then convinces the nodes near the target, which would generally be multiple 
hops away from the base station, that they are only two hops away thereby 
creating a sinkhole. Also, nodes that are far away think that they are neighbors 
because of the wormhole created. In our scheme an adversary cannot launch a 
wormhole attack after key establishment as at that point every node has 
knowledge about its neighbors so it is not easy to convince a node that it is near 
a particular compromised node. 
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Comparison with other schemes: 
 
 
Table: 5.1 
Security analysis 
 
Different 
Attacks 
Sajid‟s 
scheme 
[16] 
TLA 
[14] 
Erik‟s 
scheme 
[15] 
LEAP 
[19] 
Our 
scheme 
Dos √ √ √ √ √ 
Eavesdropping    √ √ 
Hello flood  √ √ √ √ 
Worm-hole √ √ √ √ √ 
Sink hole √ √ √ √ √ 
Sybil √  √ √ √ 
Clone     √ 
 
 
From the above table 5.1 we can see that our scheme can prevent most of 
the major attacks and better than the other schemes we have taken as our 
related work in terms of security. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
In various applications, WSNs enable the monitoring of the target system 
or area. Especially in areas such as military, commercial and privacy 
applications, ensuring security is the most important issue. In this paper, we 
propose  an enhanced heterogeneous B+ tree based  key management scheme 
for wireless sensor networks that ensures security and survivability. In our 
scheme at first we design a B+ tree that stores keys  to protect the node-to-
cluster Heads communication and similar tree is generated by Base Station to 
secure the link of Cluster Head-to-Base Station . Then we utilize random key 
predistribution to initiate the security of WSN, which mainly support node-to-node 
security and a mutual trust authentication mechanism. In this scheme security is 
fortified by using hash functions and XOR operations to renew keys at regular 
interval or whenever a compromised node. In contrast to other similar security 
solutions like those of Sajid et. al, TLA and LEAP, the salient advantage of this 
work is that we addressed challenging security issues of runtime phase by real 
time rekey, which can efficiently protect the network against attacks of 
eavesdropping or captured nodes compromise and so on. Also our scheme 
performance excels in terms of communication, computation and storage when 
compared the above mentioned schemes. We  hope our work is accepted and 
implemented for betterment of humanity. There is still lot of scope for future 
works on generation of keys and on re-key message update cycles. We propose 
to seamlessly integrate WSN security with a promising protocol that provides 
more security and energy efficiency.  
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